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FOOTPRINTS IN THE SHIFTING SANDS OF THE ISLE OF
PALMS: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY
TAKINGS CASES

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari during its 1991 term to
review three decisions that riveted the attention of the land use bar.'
Practitioners hoped that decisions in these cases would yield reliable
definitions as to when a public regulation constitutes a taking of private property compensable under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The stakes were high as evidenced by more than fifty
amicus curiae briefs filed in the most closely watched of the three
.~
as diverse as
cases: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal C o u n ~ i lGroups
the National Cattlemen's Association, the Property Rights Preservation Association, and the Pacific Legal Foundation urged the Court to
decide for the property owner.3 Entities ranging from the Municipal

B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. University of Michigan 1966. Mr. Nolon is the
Charles A. Fmeauff Research Professor at Pace Law School in White Plains, New York, where
he teaches and writes in the areas of land use, property, environmental regulation, and real estate
transactions and finance. He has co-authored with Duo Dickinson Common WalIs/Private
Homes: Multiresidential Design (1990), sewed on BNA's editorial board for the Housing and
Development Reporter, and advises in rural and urban developments in Latin America.
1. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (granting certiorari),
and rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 112 S. Ct. 414 (1991)
(granting certiorari), and cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.
Ct. 294 (1991) (granting certiorari), and aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
2. 1 I2 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
3. See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae & Brief Amici Curiae of Mountain
States Legal Found. & the Nat'l Cattlemen's Ass'n in Support of Petitioner at 6, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (No. 91-453); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific
Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner David H. Lucas at 4-6, id.; Washington Legal Found.,
Allied Educational Found., Property Rights Preservation, Inc., & Fairness to Land Owners Committee as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6-7, id;

Heinonline

8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1 19921993

2

J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 8:l

Art Society of New York, the Sierra Club, and the American Planning
Association argued in favor of the State of South C a r ~ l i n a . ~
The first case disposed of was PFZ Properties v. Rodriguez.' It presented a familiar set of facts: the developer was unable to obtain a
construction permit for a proposed development after a long and torturous review process involving many delays. In March of 1992, the
slaking
Court simply ruled that certiorari was granted impr~vidently,~
none of the thirst for definitive guidelines caused by a drought of
clearly reasoned opinions in recent years.
The summary treatment of PFZ Properties heightened interest in
Yee v. City of Escondido,' in which a property owner complained that
a California mobile home rent control scheme constituted a regulatory
taking. In a decision by Justice O'Connor rendered in April, 1992, the
Court confined its opinion to the narrow question of whether the regulation authorized a "physical occupation" of the plaintiff's p r ~ p e r t y . ~
The Court found no such invasion and upheld the state court's decision in favor of the rent control ordinance. The decision did not address broader regulatory takings issues because the Yees did not
include such claims in their appeaLg
It was not until the last day of the term, June 29, 1992, that the
Court decided Lucas. By that time, interest could not have been
greater. At issue was the validity of a regulation that prohibited all
permanent development of the plaintiff's two beachfront lots. The
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the regulation by a 3-2 margin
because it prevented a "great public harm."I0 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed that determination and remanded the case to determine
whether South Carolina's common law of nuisance could prohibit the
construction of single-family housing on the lots." The fractured

4. See generally Brief of the Municipal Art Society of New York, Inc., Amicus Curiae, in
Support of Affirmance, id.; Brief Amici Curiae of Sierra Club, the Humane Society of the United
States, and the American Institute of Biological Sciences in Support of Respondent, id.; Brief for
American Planning Association and Tahoe Regional Planning Agency as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent, id.
5. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 414
(1991), cert. dismhed, 112 S. Ct. 1151 (1992). PFZ Properties claimed that the reviewing agency's delay and ultimate denial of their project approval constituted a violation of its equal protection and procedural and substantive due process rights. Id. at 30. Its action was not based on the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 30 n.2.
6. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez. I I2 S. Ct. 1IS1 (1992) (dismissing certiorari).
7. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992). aff'g 274 Cal. Rptr. 551 (Ct. App. 1990).
8. Id. at 1528.
9. Id. at 1532-34.
10. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal.Counci1, 404 s.E.21 895, 898 (S.C. 1991). rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
I I . Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886,2901-02 (1992).
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Court delivered an opinion in which five justices formed a majority,12
one concurred,I3 another submitted a separate "~tatement,"~~
and two
vigorously dissented.Is A close examination of the divided opinion reveals a faint trail to follow in exploring regulatory takings jurisprudence; the decision left shallow footprints in the shifting coastal sands
of South Carolina where the contested regulation prevented the development of the plaintiffs land.
A.

The Takings Enigma

The federal Constitution uses a semicolon to separate its Due Process and Takings Clauses: "nor shall any person be . . . deprived of . .
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."I6 Both provisions
protect property rights. The first guards against deprivations of property without due process. The second prohibits the taking of property
by the sovereign for other than a public purpose and only if just compensation is paid.
Historically, the validity of land use regulations protecting the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare is reviewed under the separate Due Process Clause. Courts uphold such regulations if the regulatory objective is legitimate and properly promoted by the regulation. If
the regulation violates due process requirements, courts will enjoin its
enforcement, thereby relieving the property owner of its effect. Moreover, the owner may bring an action for consequential damages."
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause allows the government to single out individual properties or property interests and to appropriate
them for a valid public purpose. The clause requires only that the
owner receive just compensation: the full value of the interest appropriated. In general, the Takings Clause requires the courts to be vigilant that government actions and enterprises do not acquire such
interests, directly or indirectly, without payment of just compensation.

.

12. Id. at 2887 ( S d i a , J., writing for Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor, and Thomas, J.J.).
13. Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 2925 (statement of Souter, J.).
15. Id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16.' U.S. CONST.amend. V. These standards are equally applicable to the regulations of federal, state, and local agencies. See U.S. CONST.amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.v. City of Chicago, 166 U S . 226, 241 (1897) (applying the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states and their instrumentalities).
17. See42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1988) ("Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects
. . any citizen . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.").

.

.
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It is axiomatic that a land use regulation may not "take" property if
it does not further a public purpose. A reviewing court may invalidate
a regulation that does not advance a proper interest because it is repugnant to due process principles. T o award just compensation for property interests taken by such a regulation would allow what the Fifth
Amendment prohibits: the taking of property for other than a public
purpose. So, the notion that a regulation may be a Fifth Amendment
taking-a regulatory taking-is enigmatic.'*
B.

Uncertainty in the Case Law

Seeds of confusion in distinguishing a proper regulation from a taking were first sown in 1922, when Justice Holmes stated "while property may be regulated t o a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."I9 For a half century thereafter, the
Court entertained no occasion t o explain how one determines when a
regulation goes too far. Beginning in 197820and culminating in a 1987
trilogy of cases,2' the Court struggled with this issue, piercing little of
its enigmatic nature.22 Indeed, some opinions created additional confusion by indicating that just compensation may be awarded when a reg~~
ulation eliminates all land value, if only t e m p ~ r a r i l y .Some
commentators suggested that the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
certain types of regulatory takings cases, an uncharacteristic attitude.24
The cases decided by the 1991 term of the U.S. Supreme Court did
little to eliminate the disarray of judicial tests for regulatory takings.25
18. See Jerold S. Kayden, Judges As Planners: Limited or General Partners? in ZONINGAND
AMERICAN
DREAM:PROMISES
STILLTO KEEP 235-37 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden
eds.. 1989). The issue of how enigmatic is the concept of a "regulatory taking," in practice.
provides an interesting topic for additional research. As future cases are decided, it will be interesting to inquire whether just compensation awards are limited primarily t o those instances where
all, or nearly all, value of the land has been denied its owner. If so, the enigma will prove to be
mostly theoretical.
19. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
20. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
21. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
22. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Even the wisest lawyers would
have to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence.").
23. First English, 482 U.S. at 317-18; cj. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles. 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 904-05 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding on remand that the
regulation did not constitute a taking because it substantially advanced the state's interest in public safety).
24. See, e.g.. Craig A. Peterson. Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches. 39 HASTINGSL.J. 335. 352 (1988) (characterizing NoNan as applying
"stricter judicial scrutiny in land use regulatory takings cases").
25. See Ruddick C. Lawrence, Bright Lines in the Big City: Seawall. Tenant Succession
THE
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The language of the cases appeared hopelessly mired in an unnatural
mix of traditional due process rules and the unique takings considerations of the Just Compensation Clause. Judges and scholars have
searched valiantly for unifying principles, formal guidelines, definitive
allocations of burdens of proof, fixed standards of judicial deference,
precise factors for balancing private and public interests, distinctions
between regulations that prevent harm and those that promote public
benefits, clear exceptions to the fixed rules being sought, and a hierarchy of interests to use in a balancing process that is yet undefined."
Despite the energy devoted to these efforts, the collected decisions of
our federal and state courts provide few fixed rules to guide the practitioner, judge, law professor, property owner, or regulator. These matters are litigated so vigorously today that the forces arrayed against
land use regulations have been classified as a m~vernent.~'
C. Purpose of Article

This article endeavors to provide a practical perspective on, and to
derive some practical lessons from, the judicial decisions in the regulatory takings field. Part I1 examines and evaluates the Lucas case and
its categorical test for reviewing regulations that constitute !'total takings:" where no productive use of land is left by the regulation. The
discussion contrasts Lucas to the standardless inquiry prescribed for
the vast majority of cases where the regulation leaves the owner some
value. Part I11 describes the operating technique of federal and state
judges in deciding regulatory takings cases and concludes that the results in cases can be understood, if not predicted, through an analysis
of the factual context of each case.
Rights. and the Jurkprudence of Takings, 91 COLUM.L. REV. 609, 609 (1991) ("The jurisprudence of takings has been variously described as 'untidy and confused,' 'somewhat illogical.' 'a
muddle,' 'a crazyquilt pattern,' 'open-ended and standardless,' 'chaotic,' 'mystifying,' and 'incoherent."').
26. See, e.g., Lynn Ackerman, Searching for a Standard for Regulatory Takings Based on
Investment-Backed Expectations: A Survey of State Court Deckions in the Vested Rights and
Zoning EFtoppel Areas, 36 EMORY
L.J. 1219 (1987); Jerry L. Anderson, Takings and Expectations: Toward A "Broader Virion" of Property Rights. 37 KAN.L. REV.529 (1989); Raymond R.
Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings
Jurkptudence. 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990); John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings:
A Deckional Model for the Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV.465 (1983); Douglas W. Kmiec, The
Original Understanding of the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLW. L. REV.
1630 (1988); Susan J. Krueger, Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis: ~ o w a r dRedefining Takings Law, 64 N.Y .U. L. REV. 877 (1989); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In
Search of Underlying Principles Part 11-Takings As Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification. 78 CAL.L. REV. 53 (1990).
27. Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addrwes Property Rights, WASH.
POST,Feb. 16, 1992, at HI (referring to "an increasingly militant property-rights movement").

Heinonline

8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 5 19921993

6

J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 8:1

Part IV argues that all regulatory taking controversies fit into one of
four factual contexts. It discusses cases in each of these four categories
and explains how and why courts tend to reach understandable results
using predictable operating techniques in each category. Part V derives
guidelines from these insights to help regulators draft regulations that
will withstand judicial scrutiny and identify those that will not. The
conclusion argues that most regulations will not be invalidated, but
that regulators should infuse maximum fairness into their regulatory
regimes for a variety of persuasive reasons.

The Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciP8
applied a categorical test for reviewing "total takings." A discussion
of the opinion provides an opportunity to examine the larger issue of
judicial deference to the judgments of regulators and to pinpoint where
a more exacting standard of review is used by the Court. The Lucas
opinion should be of limited importance, if confined to similar fact
patterns. It raises, however, a host of unresolved issues that merit a
thorough examination of its facts and holding.
A.

The Lucas Controversy

David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots in 1986 for $975,000.29
In 1988, the State of South Carolina passed the Beachfront Management Act30which, by virtue of a setback provision, prohibited the development of all permanent habitable structures on Lucas' pr~perty.~'
Lucas claimed that he had purchased the lots to build single-family
housing, in accordance with applicable zoning, and that he had engaged an architect to draw plans for two houses: one for sale, the other
for the use of his family.j2
At first blush, this appeared to be a classic case of an unsuspecting
purchaser having his entire investment destroyed by a subsequent regulation. Since 1979, however, Lucas had been a contractor and realtor
in the development of the barrier island known as the Isle of Palms.
He purchased two lots there with apparent knowledge of the fragile
and changing state of affairs on the barrier island. Studies existed

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

I12 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
Id. at 2889.
See S.C. CODEANN.55 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
Id. at 2889.
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showing vast fluctuations of the shoreline and considerable erosion of
the area in the vicinity of the plaintiff's property. During half the time
since 1949, all or part of the property was part of the beach or flooded
~
offered studies claiming that, over a 1500
daily by tide ~ a t e r s . 3Lucas
year period, the Isle of Palms was accreting, moving seaward, except
for a few episodes of erosion."
The State of South Carolina argued that, due to the unstable nature
of the barrier island, there was a high risk that structures and their
occupants would be vulnerable to adverse weather condition^.'^ As
borne out by Hurricane Hugo, extreme winds break up structures on
barrier island beaches and carry them like projectiles onto adjacent are a ~ . 'Severe
~
storms can break septic tanks and sewer lines, leading to
contamination of coastal waters. The cost to the public for cleanup
and relief is ~onsiderable.~'
The trial court found that the restrictions constituted a regulatory
The
taking and awarded Lucas $1,232,387.50 as just c~mpensation.~~
Lucas
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed this determinati~n.'~
conceded at trial that the Beachfront Management Act was a proper
and valid effort to preserve South Carolina's beaches, an extremely
valuable resource. His position was simply that since the regulation denied him all economically viable use of his property, the state must
compensate him. This, he claimed, was so even if the regulation prevented serious public harm.40
I.

The Deferential Role of Reviewing Courts

The South Carolina Supreme Court paid great deference to the determinations of the state legislature, noting that it was bound by the
"uncontested legislative finding^."^' The court accepted the legislative
determination that the prevention of new construction near the beach
was necessary to prevent a "great public harm."42 The acquiescence of
33. Record at 84. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991) (No.
23,342), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
34. Id. at 26.
35. Id. at 77-87.
36. Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifring Doctrines: The Supreme Court's [Changing]
Takings Doctrine Through [sic] and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Statute, 79 CAL.L. REV.205.
207, 212-16 (1991).
37. Id.
38. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2890 (1992).
39. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
. .
40. Id. at 898.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the South Carolina court is consistent with the historic role of the
courts in the land use area.
Since the seminal case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty C O . , ~ ~
in which the U.S. Supreme Court first upheld zoning, the judiciary has
been highly deferential to legislative determinations of the need to regulate land use in the public interest. The Court struck its deferential
posture in Euclid with this sentence: "If the validity of the legislative
classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative
judgment must be allowed to control.""
Where the prevention of great public harm has been the aim of regulations in the past, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly has deferred to
legislative judgments. As recently as 1987, in Keystone Bituminous
the Court wrote: "[Tlhe Commonwealth
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicti~,~~
of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant
threat to the common welfare."46 On the strength of findings contained in the Pennsylvania act itself, the Court upheld a regulation that
prevented the plaintiffs from mining a part of their subsurface estate,
rejecting their claim that this deprivation of property amounted to a
regulatory taking.47 The South Carolina Supreme Court majority cited
Keystone for the proposition that "all property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be
~ state court stood in the maininjurious t o the c o r n m ~ n i t y . " ~The
stream of regulatory takings jurisprudence by deferring to a legislative
determination of what uses of property are injurious.
2. More Demanding Judicial Review I n Rare Cases

No U.S. Supreme Court decision has upheld a land use regulation
that left the property owner with no productive use of the affected
property. In theory, such a ruling is possible. If all productive uses of a
property are sufficiently injurious to the community, the right of productive use arguably is not among the rights held by the property
43. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
44. Id. at 388; see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) ("City councils . . . are
better qualified than the courts" to make these determinations); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works,
274 U.S. 325 (1927) ("[IJt is impossible for us to say that [this zoning decision] was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable."); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (holding that challenger overcame presumption of validity by proving affirmatively that the regulation bore no
relation to advancing a public interest).
45. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
.
.
46. Id. at 485,
.
.
47. Id. at'501-02.
48. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491-92 (1987)), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992). The phrase seems to have originated in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,665 (1887).

'
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owner. In practice, however, most regulations leave some beneficial
use and such a case seldom arises to test the theory. Lucas is the rare
exception.
In Lucas, the trial court found that the plaintiff was denied all economic use of his land.49 Resting on that conclusion, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, noted that where all economic use is taken,
the public interest advanced by the legislature in support of the regulation cannot, in itself, justify the regulation.'O In other words, deference
to the legislative finding does not conclude the inquiry. In these cases,
where the plaintiff proves that there is no economic use of the property, Scalia held that "no matter how weighty the public purpose behind [the regulation], we have required cornpensati~n."~'
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the majority's approach
"alters the long-settled rules of Ljudicial] review" and places the "burden of showing the regulation is not a taking" on the state.52Scalia
conceded that the Court never stated the justification for the rule he
~ explained his approach in the following manfollowed in L ~ c a s . 'He
ner:
1. In the "extraordinary circumstance when no productive
or economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less
realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is
simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life."'54
Implicitly, the burden on the individual owner in such a case is
simply too great, consequently violating historical standards of
fairness.
2. In such cases, there is a "heightened risk that private
property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."55 Eminent
domain law allows the acquisition of private lands of the type
owned by Lucas for a variety of public purposes. Scalia seemed
to "sense" that the regulation accomplished a public enterprise

49. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2908 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The Court creates its new taking jurisprudence based on the trial court's finding that
the property had lost all economic value. This finding is almost certainly erroneous.").
50. See id. at 2898 n.12. Scalia's conclusion echoes Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone: "[O]ur cases have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the
value of a parcel of property." Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470.
513 (1987) (Rehnquist, C..J., dissenting).
51. Lucas, l t 2 S . C t . a t 2 8 9 3 .
52. Id. at 2 h 9 .
53. Id. at2894.
54. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
55. Id. at 2895.
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outside the strictures of the eminent domain law, thus requiring
compensation. One assumes this sense is stimulated only in
those cases where the property owner is left with nothing.
3. The majority saw only one instance in which a regulation
that takes "all economically beneficial use of land" could be
upheld: where the limitation placed on the property by the
regulation inheres in the title itself.% If, under the nuisance law
of the state, the use restriction could be imposed by adjacent
landowners as a private nuisance or by the state under its
power to abate public nuisances, then the regulation will stand.
Scalia borrowed from the Restatement (Second) of Tort$' to
illustrate the factors figuring into such an analysis. They
include: the degree of harm involved in the unregulated use of
the affected property, the alternative means available to avoid
that harm, the social value of that use, and the suitability of
that use in the locality. In Scalia's opinion, "[ilt seems unlikely
that [such] common-law principles would have prevented the
erection of any habitable or productive improvements" on
Lucas' land.5s
56. Id. at 2899.
57. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OF TORTS$8 826-827 (1979).
58. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. It is interesting that, in the absence of federally subsidized
flood insurance or a state requirement that insurance companies doing business in South Carolina
participate in shared-risk insurance pools, very little development could occur on beachfront lots
in high-erosion and high-risk areas. Private construction loans and permanent mortgages for development will not be issued by lenders in the Isle of Palms market area unless evidence of property insurance is provided as part of an application for such financing. John R. Nolon, Survey of
Lending & Insurance Practices on the Isle of Palms (Sept. 11. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, o n
file with the Journal of Land Use & Environmental Law). Conventional property insurance coverage is not provided by private insurance companies for development on the Isle of Palms within
1000 feet of the beachfront. Id. This includes the setback area established by the Beachfront
Management Act: the property restriction contested in Lucm. A proposal t o eliminate federal
flood insurance for new construction in high erosion areas passed the House of Representatives in
May, 1991, by a vote of 388 to 16, with the unanimous approval of South Carolina's representatives. See 137 CONG. REC. H2633, H2653 (daily ed. May 1, 1991) (passing H.R. 1236, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)). A similar proposal is pending before the Senate. See S. 1650, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Presumably, the state legislature could act to limit its insurance pooling
requirements, see S.C. CODEANN.$ 38-35-370 (Law. C o o p . 1985), leaving beachfront developers
in high-risk areas no method of obtaining casualty insurance, and therefore no ability to qualify
for construction or mortgage financing.
These facts raise a n interesting question of whether the limitations on development imposed by
the challenged regulation in Lucas "inhere in the title [of the property] itself." Lucm, 112 S. Ct.
at 2900, due to local industry practices, shaped by prevailing legal considerations in the unregulated private market. A corollary question is whether the elimination of these government-sponsored insurance programs would constitute a "newly legislated" limitation on development of the
type Scalia says legislatures may not pass without compensation, if their effect is to deny all
productive use of land. Id. Simply stating these queries raises obvious questions about the wisdom
of judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives in these complex and interrelated areas of society.
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B.

Summary of the Holding in Lucas

The Court created an exception to the general rulesQof takings law
that requires deference to legislative determinations. That exception
applies when all economically beneficial use of the land is prohibited.
In such a case, courts owe little deference to legislative determinations.
The only limitation to this exception occurs when, under common law
principles, the use denied by the regulation can be abated as a nuisance. Lucas swings the balance heavily from the legislative chamber to
the bench in total takings cases. By reversing the historical standard of
deference and defining nuisances through reference to case law, the
Court left the legislature little, if any, ability to regulate in its discretion where the regulation denies all use.60

-

.

.

59. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); see also supra notes 4148 and
accompanying text; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[Tlhe existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed.").
60. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Troubled by "the Court's reliance
on common-law principles of nuisance in its quest for a value-free taking jurisprudence," id.,
Blackmun states: "In determining what is a nuisance at common law, state courts make exactly
the decision that the Court finds so troubling when made by the South Carolina General Assembly today: they determine whether the use is harmful." Id.
There is considerable irony in this reliance on the common law of nuisance in Lucas. In 1970,
New York's highest court held that litigation under nuisance doctrines was not competent to resolve the broad geographical impacts of air pollution and similar matters. It wrote:
A court should not try to d o this on its own as a by-product of private litigation and
it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared t o lay down and implement an
effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and should
not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a dispute between property owners and
a single cement plant-one of many-in the Hudson River valley.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.M 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). The irony arises in comparing
this language t o that of Justice Scalia in Lucas:
Any limitation so severe [as a total taking] cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, d o no more than
duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by
the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 (emphasis added).
'Scalia defines nuisance exclusively by reference t o the case law. Under Boomer, the highest New
York'couit declared its incompetence, in the context of a private case, t o handle matters involving
broad' geographical impacts such as air pollution and, one would suppose, coastal protection.
There is a worrisome Catch-22 situation here, a gap in logic and strategy that protects the property owner from a total taking, leaving the communitarian interest in critical environmental protection in the breach.
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I. Application of the Lucas Holding
Justice Blackmun began his dissent by saying "[tloday the Court
launches a missile to kill a mouse."61 Blackmun's metaphor addressed
a portion of the opinion where the majority conceded that cases where
the state prohibits all economic use of real estate will arise "relatively
Noting this, Blackrarely" or only in "extraordinary circ~mstances."~~
mun "question[ed] the Court's wisdom in issuing sweeping new rules
to decide such a narrow case."63 Blackmun feared that "the Court's
new policies will spread beyond the narrow confines of the present
This fear is well founded.'j5 When in Nollan, for example, Justice
Scalia used new language to define the extent to which the means chosen to accomplish a public purpose must actually further that purpose,
speculation flourished as to whether this implied a stricter standard of
judicial review and whether such a standard adheres to the narrow
facts of the case, or whether it generally should be applied to regulatory takings cases.66Since then, federal and state appellate cases have
answered these questions in a variety of ways.67For example, in Sea, ~ ~York's highest court inwall Associates v. City of New Y ~ r k New
vented three separate types of per se takings categories based on
Scalia's new language.69
The U.S. Supreme Court has not identified discrete classes of regulatory takings cases in which clear rules of judicial review apply. As a
result, tests and standards developed in one context can bleed through
to other types of cases. Does Lucas, for example, reverse Miller v.
Schoene,'O where the Court sustained a regulation ordering the complete destruction of plaintiff's cedar trees to prevent the spread of infestation to valuable apple trees on neighboring properties? In Miller,
the Court did not "weigh with nicety the question whether the infected
cedars constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether
61. Lucm, 112 S. Ct. at 2904.
62. See id. at 2894,2904.
63. Id. at 2904.
64. Id. The day after Lucm was decided, for example, five Massachusetts lawmakers filed a
bill to repeal the State's Watershed Protection Act, citing Lucm as the reason. Repeal Sought for
Watershed Act, BOSTONGLOBE,
July 1 , 1992, at 50.
65. See infra notes 173-80.
66. . Nollan v. Cdifornia Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 n.3 (1987);see Peterson, supra
.
note 24.
67. See generally-Jerold S. Kayden. ~ o n Use
d Regulations, ~ationality,and Judicial Review:
The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URB.LAW. 301 (1991).
68. 542 N.E.2d 1059 ( N . Y . 1989).
69. See discussion infra part IV.B.2.
70. 276 U.S. 272,281 (1928).
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they may be so declared by ~tatute."~'The Miller facts raise the specter
of an imminent public peril, while Lucas involves an evolution of public understanding about the dangers of development on a barrier island. '*
Further, it is by no means clear what Scalia meant when he referred
to the denial of "all economically beneficial or productive use of
land."73 In fact, throughout the opinion he used other phraseology including "economically viable use of . . land,"74 "total deprivation of
beneficial use, "75 "no productive or economically beneficial use,"76
and "without economically beneficial or productive options for . . .
use."77 What these various phrases mean depends as well on the property interest to which they are applied. Lucas lost the highest and best
use of the property, but not his right of possession, right to exclude,
right to alienate, or his right to enjoy his property in its undeveloped
state. Do these rights have value? Are they part of the equation used to
determine whether all "beneficial use" is taken?
Finally, Scalia's additional language regarding the property interest
involved in the takings analysis is bound to result in additional confusion. He commented that "uncertainty regarding the composition of
the denominator in our 'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the
In fact, there has been very little
disagreement in the cases, since almost all of them have held that it is
the diminution in the market value of the total estate that is reviewed
to measure the burden on the private owner.
Scalia's comment will likely spur litigation in those highly unusual
circumstances where state laws first create a discrete and unusual property estate, and then affect that estate through regulation. Affected
owners may advance the argument that the value of that discrete estate

.

71. Id. at 280.
72. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Stevens noted that, at one time. the Court had endorsed this view:
[Tlhe supervision of the public health and the public morals is a governmental power,
"continuing in its nature," and "to be dealt with as the special exigencies of the moment may require;" . . . "for this purpose, the largest legislative discretion is allowed,
and the discretion cannot be parted with any more than the power itself."
Id. (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,669 (1887)).
73. Id. at 2893; c/. id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The trial court appeared to believe that the [ L u w ] property could be considered 'valueless' if it was not available for its most
profitable use.").
74. Id. at 2983 n.6 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470.
495 (1987)), 2984 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260 (1980)).
75. Id. at 2894.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2894-95.
78. Id. at 2894 n.7.
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is the denominator used in measuring the degree of diminution effected
~~
where state law affects a possessory esby the r e g ~ l a t i o n .Similarly,
tate, such as an easement to traverse, courts assess the impact on that
estate i t ~ e l f Although
.~
this "uncertainty" has arisen in narrow circumstances,.landowners are being counselled generally to learn "[hlow
to fractionalize current property holdings to discourage regulation"
and how to "define 'the parcel' or property unit to demonstrate deprivation of all economically-feasible use."8i
Presumably, the Lucas Court meant to limit its holding to the facts
of the case, which are narrow indeed. But Scalia's words can only encourage developers to challenge regulations that diminish the value of
their lands. At the very least, the pace of litigation in this already litigious field will quicken as a result of the Supreme Court's decision.
Moreover, the nondeferential test of Lucas may be nourished by the
general confusion in this area and grow without great regard for the
presumed intent of the Court that articulated it. In that respect, Blackmun's fears may be prophetic.
2. Analysis of the Lucas Holding
Despite these concerns, not much should happen as a result of
L u ~ a s The
. ~ ~ holding is properly confined to the facts of the case,

79. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) with Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497-502 (1987).
80. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825, 831-37 (1987).
8 1. NATIONALREAI ESTATEDEVELOPMENT
CENTER,HOW TO SUCCESSFULLY
RESOLVE
LAND
USE & REAL ESTATEISSUESIN THE WAKEOF L u c a 2 (1992) (advertising "tactical workshop" on
overcoming regulations) (on file with the Journal of Land Use di Environmental Law). The proposition is dubious that a regulatory taking will be found where an owner purchases property and
intentionally subdivides it, segments its title, or otherwise manipulates it so that a portion of
property is unusable under applicable land regulations. If the facts are known to a court, would it
decide that the owner is "unduly singled out" by the regulation or that "essential fairness" is
denied? That courts will seek such facts and question so-called "fractionalization" or "segmentation" of property is apparent in the tests adopted by the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether a
regulation has taken all or substantially all value. These factors include "the history of development-what was built on the property and by whom? How was it subdivided and to whom was it
sold? What plats were filed?"; and "what is the present nature and extent of the property?"
Reahard v. Lee County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
82. But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2921-22 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In the area of statutory nuisance prevention, Stevens sees a considerable problem:
Under the Court's opinion today, however, if .a state should decide to prohibit the
manufacture of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable firearms, for example, it must be
prepared t o pay for the adverse economic consequences of its decision. One must wonder if Government will be able to "go on" effectively if it must risk compensation "for
every such change in the general law."
Id. at 2921 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393.413 (1922)).
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which the Court itself characterized as "relatively rare."83 In fact,
there is already precedent for per se takings of this sort in cases like
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Gorp.," where a publicly
imposed physical connection of a television cable was deemed a taking
per se even though the space invaded was less than one and one half
cubic feet.8s Although such cases d o not fall quite like Scalia's guillotine, the basic holding in Lucas does not represent a dramatic departure, if confined to similar facts.
Unfortunately, at the end of the term, the troubled field of regulatory takings remained unsettled by PFZ Properties, Yee, and Lucas.
Scalia did provide in Lucas an interesting review of the takings field.
He affirmed that regulations d o not owe their validity to any claim
that they prevent or eliminate noxious or harmful uses.86 He set to rest
the much-debated harm/benefit analysis as an unhelpful means of separating regulatory takings from "regulatory deprivations that do not
Instead, Scalia tells us, regulations are valid
require c~mpensation."~~
simply because they are "reasonably related to the implementation of a
policy-not unlike historic preservation-expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated prope r t ~ . "A~ "land-use
~
regulation does not effect a taking if it
'substantially advanceis] legitimate state interest^."'^^
Scalia's review of takings jurisprudence may tend to blunt challenges
to the legitimacy of certain regulatory programs, such as historic preservation or viewshed protection. With that clarifying exception, Lucas
does not settle this area of the law. One can expect more cases like
Seawall that seek to expand on the per se takings category of ~ a s e s . ~
Future areas of litigation include: the continuing debate over the meaning of Scalia's "essential nexus" test in Nollan; persistent confusion as
to what constitutes the "property interest" affected by a regulation;
attempts by land owners to stretch the meaning of "no productive or
economically beneficial use" beyond the confines of the Lucas facts;
experiments with property segmentation and property interest sever83. Id. at 2894.
84. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
85. Id.at421.
86. Lucm, 112 S. Ct. at 2897; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 134 (1978) (stating that valid exercises of the police power do not depend on "any
supposed 'noxious' quality of the prohibited uses, but rather on the ground that the restrictions
were reasonably related to the implementation of a policy . . expected to produce a widespread
public benefit").
87. Lucas, 1 I2 S . Ct. at 2899.
88. Id. at 2897.
89. Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825.834 (1987)).
90. See Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York. 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y. 1989).

.

Heinonline

8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 15 19921993

J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.

16

[Vol. 8: 1

ance; and exploration of the extent and scope of Scalia's policy of no
deference in Lucas.

The cumulative effect of the much-anticipated cases of the 1991
term, then, is the creation of additional questions for the courts and
land use lawyers. The challenge of formulating practical strategies for
proceeding through this judicial thicket is great indeed. This challenge
is partially met through an examination of the operating techniques of
judges facing regulatory taking claims.
A.

Judges, Case Law and Social Norms

In 1928, Karl Llewellyn faced a similar challenge when he undertook
to explain the American case law system to German students at the
Leipzig Faculty of Law. He noted that, in our system:
Legal uncertainties arise far more when nonlegal norms in a society
are in conflict . . . . [Conflicts among interest groups] are fact
situations that arise because the margins of growth keep shifting in
real life, and for that very reason they shift the law's margins of
growth too . . . . The critical case always involves a fact situation not
from the stable core but from the growth zone of life waiting to be
reg~lated.~'

Six decades removed, these words help to explain the unsettled nature of takings law. We as a society have not resoIved the tension between property and environmental rights. Controversies abound and
many law suits contest the effects of land use regulation^.^^ In this respect, the dispute between Mr. Lucas and the State of South Carolina
is a tremor running along a deep fault line in American society. Mr.
-

-

p
p

-

--

91. KARLN. LLEWELLYN,
THE CASELAW SYSTEMIN AMERICA99 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).
92. See, e.g.. Keith Schneider, Environment Laws Face Stiff Test from Landowners, N.Y.
TIMES,Jan. 20, 1992, at I (referring to over 200 cases of this type pending before the U.S. Court
of Claims and characterizing the growing resistance to environmental regulation as a "movement"); see also The Private Property Rights Act of 1991, S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
This proposed legislation is evidence of the rigorous efforts of property rights groups in the legislative arena. If enacted, the measure would require federal agencies to conduct a "Takings Impact
Analysis." that is, an assessment of whether proposed regulations might result in a taking of
private property, and t o avoid such an effect, where possible. Parallel bills have been sponsored in
the ' ~ o u s eas well. See Private Property Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 905, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); Private Property Rights Act of 1991, H.R. 1572, lO2d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see also
infra note 286 (listing similar pending state legislation). See generally Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53
Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).

Heinonline

8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 16 19921993

REG ULA TOR Y TAKINGS

19921

17

Lucas himself is celebrated by a growing property rights movement.
Meanwhile, national environmental and preservation interests
staunchly defended the regulation of Lucas' land before the U.S. Supreme Court.93
How far property rights can be regulated to protect the public interest is unsettled and so, Llewellyn explains, must be the law. In these
growth areas of society and its law, Llewellyn urges us to anticipate
sensible outcomes in cases and to trust that the rules of the cases will
mesh well with the inherent reasons expressed in the opinions of courts
Outcomes in cases are "reasonably redeciding such contro~ersies.~~
ckonable. "95
1. Fact-Guided Decisions

The key to such right reckoning, according to Llewellyn, is objective
inquiry into the facts of the case at bar. The maxim ex facto jus oritur
reminds us that the law arises out of facts. Llewellyn speaks of "[the]
judges' insight into new fact situations and their meaning, being generally referred to as the 'sense of justice' in the individual case."% He
refers to this intuition as "fact-guided decision making.""
Professor Frank Michelman similarly applied this perspecfive in analyzing the trilogy of 1987 U.S. Supreme Court cases, two of which
seemed to break from the historical hands-off approach of the Court
regarding such controversies. He explained that the vulnerability of
these cases to rule of law analysis is a "sign [ofl balancing-or, better,
~~
also explained
the judicial practice of situated j ~ d g m e n t . " Llewellyn
the phenomenon of situated judgment. He referred to the lawyer's
practice of "classifying facts for purposes of description and further
93. David Kaplan & Bob Cohn, Pay Me, or Get OffMy Land, NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 9, 1992, at
70. The conflict in social values was described as follows:
Lucas's appeal is the flash point in a national clash pitting environmentalists and preservationists against a grass-roots coalition of ranchers, miners, loggers and developers.
It is a war of both spiritual principles and economic principal [sic] that is being fought
before local regulators, federal agencies, Congress and the courts. But what the justices
do is paramount: a decision may effectively gut a generation of land regulation, as well
as 50 years of judicial acquiescence to it.
Id.; see also Eugene Linden, Demanding Payment for Good Behavior, T w ,Feb. 3, 1992, at 52.
THECOMMON
LAWTRADITION:
DECIDING
APPEALS
36-37 (1960).
94. KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
95. See id. at 17 (defining reckonability as "degrees of lessening uncertainty of outcome
ranging from what . . . seems pure chance . . . [to what] is for human living 'safe"').
supra note 91, at 79.
96. LLEWELLYN,
97. Id.
98. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 1600, 1629 (1987). Compare id.
with LLEWELLYN,
supra note 91, at 60. But see REGWMDWNTER MICHAEL
DIM, JUWPRUDENCE
459 (5th ed. 1985) (criticizing this notion as "too vague, being in every case the product of a
shifting balance").
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use."99 Llewellyn found such classifying "a tacit precondition for handling any legal dispute."Io0 In Llewellyn's view, once attorneys and
judges agree on how the facts are classified, the rules of law they select
and their views of the outcome of the case become more predictable
and ~nderstandable.'~'
The discretion enjoyed by.courts in making situated judgments
brings with it the imperative that they adequately weigh facts and circumstances. If, as Llewellyn tell us, judges tend to classify the facts of
a case in seeking the rule of law to apply, there is an implied condition
that they fully consider the evidentiary record. A panel for the Eleventh Circuit recently addressed this issue in Reahard v. Lee County,I0*
when it reversed a magistrate's terse declaration that a regulation
worked a taking of private property. The appeals court stated that
"the factfinder must analyze, at the very least," questions surrounding
the economic impact of the regulation and the owner's investmentbacked expectation^.^^^
In the field of regulatory takings, the frequent reference by appellate
courts to the fact intensive nature of their deliberations sharpens this
perspective. Writing recently for a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor
noted that "[s]uch forms of regulation are analyzed by engaging in the
'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries' necessary to determine whether a
regulatory taking has occurred."104 It is the "particular circumstances"
in each case that determine the outcome of such deliberations.lo5

supra note 91. at 53 (ernphxsis omitted).
99. LLEWELLYN,
100. Id.
101. Id. at 53-54. Llewellyn admits that this process of selecting and classifying facts gives
judges some leeway in determining which rules of law to use and, thereby, the outcome of cases at
bar. "[Elach way of construing the facts will contain a degree of violence to either the fact situation or the classifying category." Id. He hastens to observe that, despite this leeway, legal certainty is derived from the pressure of the facts, working through the tradition bound, common
"sense of justice" of the judges. so that we observe a majority. "despite all their differences over
the law, nonetheless reaching the same conclusion from the same fact situation." Id.
102. %8 F.2d 1131 (I lth Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 1136.
104. Yee v. City of Exondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886, 2893 (1992) (noting that in all of these cases, the Court has "generally eschewed any 'set
formula' for determining how far is too far, preferring to 'engagte] in . . essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries"') (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978), quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (I%Z)); Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1. 10 (1988); Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. 704,714 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470.495 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426 (1982); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 11.15
(1981); Reahard v. Lee County. %8 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992); Hendler v. United States, 952
F.2d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Azul Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575, 579
(9th Cir. 1991). withdrawn on other grounds, Nos. 90-55853,9@56066, 1992 WL 168953 (9th Cir.

.
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2. No Set Formula
Despite the Supreme Court's plain statement that there is no "set
f ~ r m u l a " 'for
~ identifying a Fifth Amendment taking, the temptation
to do so seems irresistible.Io7The U.S. Supreme Court has only gone as
far as to indicate that there are several factors that have particular significance. Justice O'Connor briefly summarized these factors in the
opening paragraph of her decision in Yee:
Most of our [takings] cases . . . fall within two distinct classes.
Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of property
. . . , the Takings Clause generally requires compensation. . . . But
where t h e government merely regulates the use of property,
compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose
of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne
by the public as a whole. . . . [Tlhe second [category] necessarily
entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic
effects of government actions.lo8

B. Following the Trail of the Lucas Facts

This faint trail in the regulatory case law jungle will be picked up in
later sections of this article.Io9An analysis of the debate between the
majority and minority judges in the South Carolina Supreme Court
July 23, 1992); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676 (9th Cir. 1991); Samaad v.
City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925, 938 (5th Cir. 1991); Ciampitti v. United States, 18 CI. Ct. 548, 557
(1989); Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986). amended, 833 F.2d
1270 (9th Cir. 1987); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1985); MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 549 (9th Cir. 1984), ceri. denied, 472
U.S. 1009 (1985); Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency. 593 A.2d 1368, 1370 (Conn.
1991). This case-by-case approach seems to be guided by an understanding that the determination
of whether a law effects a taking requires a "weighing of private and public interests," Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), and is ultimately a matter of "fairness and justice."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
105. See United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155. 168 (1958); United States
v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
106. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that "this Court, quite simply, has been
unable to develop any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government"); Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 175; see also Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 161. 168 (1990) ("There is
no fixed formula for determining when a regulation or its application denies an owner economically viable use of its land and thereby results in a taking.").
107. See supra note 26.
108. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526 (citations omitted); see also Penn Central, 438 U.S.at 124-28.
109. See discussion infra part IV.
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decision in Lucas1I0illustrates the operating technique used by judges
confronted with complex regulatory taking challenges. The approaches
taken by each side in that case illustrate how judges decide cases generally and demonstrate both the constraints under which they operate
(the basis for expecting predictability in results) and the severaI Ieeways
available to them (which options breed the much lamented murkines~).~I'
The majority in the South Carolina Supreme Court case spent little
time discussing the facts. It analyzed the Beachfront Management Act
and concluded that "discouraging new construction in close proximity
to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a great public harm."'I2
The memory of recent hurricane damage highlighted the importance of
the legislative objective of providing "a barrier and buffer from high
tides, storm surge, hurricanes, and normal erosion."113In this way, the
court classified the facts of the case: the regulation merely prevents the
landowners from using their property to cause public injury.
Next, the majority took several steps within this classification to find
and apply the law. It cited the Latin maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum
non l ~ e d a s . "It~ ~
referred
~
to a recent U.S.Supreme Court opinion by
Justice Stevens for the proposition that a regulation that prevents a
nuisance-like use of one's property has taken nothing.I1*It cited several
South Carolina cases for the proposition that no regulatory taking occurs when the regulation under attack prevents "a use seriously harming the public,"116 Finally, the prevailing justices established their
standard for reviewing the regulation in question. They prescribed a
highly deferential standard: "This [clourt is likewise bound by these
uncontested legislative findings." I i 7
On its face, the majority opinion is difficult to contest. The facts are
straightforward and fit into a neat and understandable category. The
110. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991). rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
supra note 91, at 53-56,7678.
111. See LLEWELLYN.
112. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 899. The phrase translates as: "Use your own property in such manner as not to
injure that of another." See infm note 243.
115. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491 n.20 (1987) ("[Slince no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the State
has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to enjoin the nuisance-like activity.")), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
116. Id. (citing Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 314 S.E.2d 327 (S.C. 1984); Richards v. City of Columbia, 88 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1955); Arnold v. City of Spartanburg, 23 S.E.2d
735 (S.C. 1943)).
117. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
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rules of law that apply to this category seem familiar and just. In a
context of great potential harm to the public, a highly deferential standard of review rings true.
The dissent followed a similar track, yet arrived at an altogether different destination. It too spent little time on the facts, claiming that the
regulation reduced the lot values to zero.Il8 It cited a fundamental
proposition violated by the regulation: an individual should not "bear
a burden which in fairness should be borne by all."'19 When the regulation shifts the burden from the public to a private owner, a court
may conclude that the Takings Clause is implicated.
Based on this inherent sense of justice, it seems, the dissent placed
the facts in an entirely different category. Justice Harwell stated that,
in his opinion, the Beachfront Management Act did not have as its
primary purpose the prevention of a nuisance.120He opined that the
activities the Act sought to prohibit "do not rise to such a level as to
be fairly considered 'noxious."'121 The dissent saw the Act as an attempt to promote tourism, create needed natural habitats, and protect
a place that harbors natural beauty. The fury of the hurricane was not
paramount in its reckoning.
The dissent concluded that the regulation intended to accomplish a
laudable public benefit, the burdens of which should be borne by all.
From this point of reference, the dissent searched for its dispositive
rule of law. It discussed several U.S. Supreme Court cases and concluded that, in the non-nuisance prevention category of cases, the
Court employs a two-pronged test: "We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it 'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.'"Iz2 The minority easily found that the regulation violated the
second prong.
On its face, the dissenting opinion is also hard to contest. The facts
are straightforward, and fit into a neat and understandable category.
The rules of law applied to this category are familiar and just. Precedents are cited. In the context of a burdensome regulation that seeks
laudable public benefits, the dissent would subject the regulation to a

118. Id. at 907-08 (Harwell, J., dissenting) (noting, however, that Lucas might be able to
build on the lots under an amendment to the Act that allowed construction subject to the issuance
of a special permit that had not been applied for).
119. Id. at 906.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 905 (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 485
(1987)).
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review of whether it goes too far and thereby becomes a taking for
which an owner must be compensated.
IV. FOURCATEGORIES
OF TAKINGS
CASES:SITUATED
JUDGMENTS
The debate between the majority and dissent in the South Carolina
Supreme Court highlighted the lack of congruent social norms in takings cases.lZ3The majority read the act as an attempt to protect a critical natural resource and prevent serious public injury. The dissent,
sympathetic to the complete destruction of the land's market value,
saw instead a legislature promoting tourism and preserving natural
habitats for wildlife. In this, "the most perplexing area of American
land use law,"1x each side had at its disposal rules of law on which to
rely in order to vindicate its sense of justice.125
This debate illustrates two categories of "fact situations" available
to judges in the regulatory takings field. The majority sensed that the
legislature merely acted to prevent a great public harm and placed the
case in a group of cases where the primary objective of the regulation
was the prevention of public injury: the Public Injury category. The
dissent believed that the legislature was regulating to secure laudable
public benefits, short of preventing noxious or offensive uses of land:
the Public Values category.
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas placed these same
facts in yet another category. Since the regulation took all economically beneficial use, the "historical c o r n p a ~ t "contained
~~~
in the Takings Clause may have been violated. Such fact patterns fit into an
Undue Burden category of cases, so labeled because the Court concludes that one or more individual owners of property have been singled out to bear a burden that should be shouldered by the public.
These three categories cover those controversies that our society debates the most: the "growth area of the law," to use Llewellyn's
term.lZ7A more settled category of disputes involves regulations that
adjust "'the benefits and burdens of economic life' . . in a manner
that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned."lZ8 The perception is that such regulations fairly arbitrate the

.

123. Compare id. at 895-902 with id. at 902-08.
124. Id. at 903 (Harwell, J., dissenting) (quoting, Richard L. Settle, Regulatory Taking Doctrine in Washington:Now You See It. Now You Don't, 12 U . PUGETSOWDL. REV.339 (1989)).
125. See infra part V .
126. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 (1992). Undertaking a
lengthy review of the history of the Takings Clause, Justice Blackmun noted that "[ilt is not clear
from the Court's opinion where our 'historical compact' . . . comes from, but it does not appear
to be history." Id. at 2914 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
127. SeeL~~w~~~~~,supranote91,at99.
128. Lucas, 112 S . Ct. at 2894 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)).
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obligations and rights of citizenship and ownership. They can be
placed in a fourth group of cases called the Arbitration category, a
class that represents the "stable core"129 of regulatory takings law,
about which there is less social conflict and confusion in the law.
In Yee, Justice O'Connor identified two, not four, categories of regulatory takings cases and described the Court's operating technique
with respect to both.lm The first category involves government actions
that invade the physical possession of property, denying the owner the
historic and essential right to exclude others.13' When government
usurps such fundamental property rights, Justice O'Connor indicated
that "the Takings Clause generally requires ~ompensation."'~~
This
language implies that when a fundamental right is abrogated and the
Takings Clause is implicated, the Court will scrutinize the regulation
carefully. In such a case, the Court will attempt to protect the rights
guaranteed by the constitution where it senses a heightened risk of
their violation.
It is in the second category, "where the government merely regulates
the use of property,"133that the rules become murky. Since such cases
constitute the vast majority of regulatory takings disputes,134discerning
the judicial approach in this area becomes critical. Here, we are advised, the inquiry is guided by fairness and the result depends on the
character of the regulation and the extent to which the owner has been
deprived the economic use of the affected property.
A.

Arbitration Cases

Zoning, which limits uses of land and prescribes dimensional limitations on development in discrete districts, constitutes much of the Ar129. See LLEWELLYN,
supra note 94, at 99.
130. Yee v. City of Escondido. 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992); see ako Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 124-28.
131. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (noting
that the right to exclude others "has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights"). "[Plroperty law has long protected an owner's
expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his property." Id. at
436. Relying on this language, New York's highest court found a New York City regulation facially invalid because it substantially impaired three basic property rights: the right to possess, use,
and dispose. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989).
132. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526. For an example of a physical invasion of this sort that is not
compensable under the Takings Clause, see Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
836 (1987).
133. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526.
134. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992) ("(Tlhe funcrional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to affect property values without compensation . . does not apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

.
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bitration category of cases, where property uses are regulated for the
reciprocal advantage of everyone in the zoning district. All property
owners are burdened and benefitted in roughly proportionate ways.
Potential conflicts of property use and enjoyment are arbitrated by the
regulation. A certain "reciprocity of advantage" inheres in such regulations; the burdened owner measurably benefits from similar burdens
placed on others.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty C O . ' ~
in~1926, it has reviewed challenges to regulations that arbitrate burdens and benefits among property owners giving great deference to the regulator, striking down regulations rarely and only when
the challenger can prove conclusively that the regulation in question
bears "no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare."136
It was in the context of an arbitration case that the Supreme Court
articulated the test to determine whether regulations are takings.I3' In
Agins, which involved a landowner's challenge to the city's zoning ordinance, the Court framed a two-pronged test, drawing from two of its
earlier cases. Zoning "effects a taking if the ordinance 'does not substantially advance [a] legitimate state interest[]"38 or [if it] 'denies an
owner economically viable use of his land."'13g
The Supreme Court in Agins and Euclid articulated a standard set of
considerations for courts reviewing takings challenges in the arbitration context:
1. On its face, is the "'justice and fairness' guaranteed by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" respected by the
regulation? la
2. The principal indicator of fairness is "in essence a
determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden."141
135. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
136. Id. at 395; see id at 388 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control."); see also supra
notes 43-44.
137. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.255 (1980).
138. This first prong derives from Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
139. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. The second prong derives from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
140. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
141. Id. at 260; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterizes this notion as follows: "Perhaps the
most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning cases. A diminution of
value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general
and comprehensive iand use plan." Id.
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3. An additional indicator of fairness appears where the
regulation involves reciprocal benefits to the landowner and the
public. 14*
4. Since "no precise rule determines when property has been
taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private
and public interests,"143particularly in close cases.
5. The public "benefits must be considered along with any
diminution in market value" of the affected property.'"
6. Determinations of the legislature regarding the legitimacy
of the public interest will be "clothed with a strong
presumption of constituti~nality."'~~
7. Implicit in this presumption is the allocation of the
burden of proof on the challenger to prove its invalidity. This
is particularly difficult with respect to the first prong due to the
presumption.
These rules, derived from seminal cases, demonstrate the operating
methods adopted by a court working within the "stable core" of regulatory takings law. The rules encourage deference to a legislature pursuing a comprehensive plan for the municipality, meting out burdens
on land owners generally for the overall benefit of the community. A
court's sense of justice is not offended by a demonstrated diminution
in value, the methods used, or the objectives pursued by the regulators.
There is greater social conflict and therefore greater divergence
among the decisions in the other groups of cases, where society's views
are less settled. A review of illustrative cases in each of these groupings
further demonstrates the judicial operating technique in the takings
field and provides a practical basis for answering the questions faced
by public regulators and property owners.

142. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
143. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 262.
145. See Curtiss-Wright v. East Hampton, 82 A.2d 551, 553 (N.Y. 1981) (citing five other
New York cases). Early on, the U.S. Supreme Court held a similar view:
If these reasons . . . d o not demonstrate the wisdom . . of those restrictions . . . at
least, the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said
before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); see also Agins, 447 U.S.at 261
("The State of California has determined that . . . [open-space plans discourage unnecessary
growth]. Such governmental purposes have long been recognized as legitimate.").

.
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Undue Burden Cases

The first category of takings cases referenced by Justice O'Connor
in Yee146arises "[wlhere the government authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually takes title)" by the regulation.I4' In Lucas,
Scalia expanded the first class somewhat, noting that "[wle have . . .
described at least two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest adThe first of these includes "regulations
vanced" by the reg~1ation.l~~
that compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property."149 The second involves a regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive useof land. "lsO
To judges, regulations from this first category appear to take the
"fundamental" property rights of an individual, or unduly burden a
particular owner or group of owners in order to accomplish a government enterprise. The Takings Clause protects private property from
such public intrusions unless just compensation is awarded.Is1A regulation that imposes an undue burden is more likely a violation of the
intent of the framers of the Fifth Amendment. It was their objective to

146. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
147. Id. at 1526.
148. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
149. Id.
150. Id. Scalia's confirmation of this is worded as follows: "[R]egulations that leave the
owner of land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use . . . carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id. at 2894-95. Scalia also found this expectation rooted in his view of history: "[Wle think the notion . . . that title is somehow held subject
to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use
is inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of
our constitutional culture." Id. at 2900. Blackmun's dissent cautioned against such an expansive
reading of history:
But the conclusion that a regulation is not on its face a taking because it allows the
landowner some economic use of property is a far cry from the proposition that denial
of such use is sufficient to establish a taking claim regardless of any other consideration. The Court never has accepted the latter proposition.
Id. at 291 1 n.11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 2914 (noting that
Court's "historical compact" is not based on history).
151. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). In
Lorerto, the Court stated the limits of this first category:
Our holding today is very narrow. We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent
physical occupation of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner entertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property
regulation. We d o not, however, question the equally substantial authority upholding a
State's broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use of his
property.
Id.
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prevent government from singling out, or placing undue burdens on,
individual property owners in the public interest.'52
When a court senses that it is dealing with an undue burden case, its
opinion focuses on the wrong to the property. Its sense of justice is
offended. Predictably, the public policy pronouncements of the regulator enjoy less deference. The majority opinion in Lucas illustrated the
categorically different method of proceeding, once a case is placed in
the Undue Burden category. In such a case, "it is less realistic to indulge our usual assumption that the legislature is simply 'adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life."'ls3 This follows because such
regulations "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is
being pressed into some form of public service."154In these cases, the
regulations "invite exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings
Clause."t55 The challenger enjoys this stricter judicial scrutiny of the
regulation upon a showing that the regulation has "denie[d] him economically beneficial or productive use of land."I5'j Cases of this sort
tend to fall into one of two sub-categories: invasion cases and fundamental rights cases.
I. Invasion Cases

In 1871, in the case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal
Co.,IS7the Supreme Court entertained a petitioner's claim that a government action effected a taking indirectly, through the invasion of his
possessory interest, without a formal action in eminent domain. The
State of Wisconsin authorized the construction of a dam that raised
the level of an adjacent lake, flooded petitioner's property, and

152. See Lures, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)). This concept is
a mirror-image reflection of the "reciprocity of advantage" principle found in the Arbitration
category of cases. Recall that such regulations adjust "'the benefits and burdens of economic life'
. . . in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned." Id.
Regulations that fit in the Undue Burden category often violate the principle of generality that
Justice Stevens says is "well-rooted in our broader understandings of the Constitution as designed
NO. 10, at 43
in part to control the 'mischiefs of faction."' Id. at 2923 (citing THE FEDERALIST
(James Madison) ( G . Wills ed., 1982)).
153. Id. at 2894.
154. Id. at 2895.
155. Id. at 2895 n.8; see also id. at 2893 ("In general (at least with regard to permanent
invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the public purpose
behind it, we have required compensation."). Where such use is denied, "the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from our categorical rule that
total regulatory takings must be compensated." Id. at 2899.
156. Id. at 2893.
157. 80U.S. 166(1871).
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"worked an almost complete destruction of the value of the land."ls8
The Court held that "[ilt would be a very curious and unsatisfactory
result, if . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from the
absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can
destroy its value entirely . . . without making any compensation, because . . it is not taken for the public use."159
In 1945, the Court found that the dramatic impact on property enjoyment of lowflying government airplanes was "as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it," and
therefore constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.160 The Court noted
that such flights were a "direct invasion" of the owner's domain and
that "it is the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage
resulting from it, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines
the question whether it is a taking."I6' Similarly, the Court found that
a regulation imposing a public access requirement on a water channel
owned by the developer of a marina community constituted a taking.I6*
By 1982, &hisarea of case law had developed so far that a regulation
allowing a third-party cable television company to affix a cable connection to a privately owned apartment building, occupying only one
and one-half cubic feet of private property, likewise constituted an invasive taking.163
In 1987, regulatory takings jurisprudence became confused by language in an opinion by Justice Scalia that seemed to heighten the degree of scrutiny afforded land use regulations. In Nollan v. California
Coastal C o r n r n i ~ s i o nas
, ~ ~a ~condition for granting a permit to build

.

158. Id. at 177.
159. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
160. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1945).
161. Id. at 266 (quoting United States v. Cress. 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)). There are at least
two attributes of this invasion that define its "character" as a taking. First, the government's
action was in the nature of a trespass on the possessory rights of the owner. The effect on the
property owner was so great that the flights amounted t o the imposition of a servitude on the
property, greatly affecting "ltlhe owner's right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say, his
beneficial ownership of it." Id. at 262. Second, the government action complained of was a governmental enterprise: the operation of a military airport. The Takings Clause is implicated particularly through the imposition of servitudes on private land incident to the operation of a public
enterprise. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution
to enable the government t o appropriate private property interests for such enterprises.
162. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this case, we hold that
the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls
within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation.") (footnote omitted).
163. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 438 (1982). In Lucas,
Justice Scalia noted this line of reasoning when he wrote: "no matter how minute the intrusion,
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation." Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
164. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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on beachfront property, the jurisdiction mandated that the property
owner grant the public a lateral easement, running from the mean high
tide line to an existing seawall on the property.165The Nollans had applied for a permit that would allow them to build a house larger than
permitted.166They contested the permit condition as a violation of their
right to exclude others from their property.
The Nollan decision, written by Justice Scalia, placed these facts
squarely in the Undue Burden category: ,an invasion case. "Indeed,
one of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that
the government be able to require conveyance of just such interests, so
long as it pays for them."167 In the Court's opinion, this was a classic
eminent domain, or takings, issue.168
Scalia referenced the Agins two-pronged test.169Without discussing
whether the condition denied the owners economical use of their land,
he proceeded directly to an examination of whether it substantially advanced legitimate state interests. The majority assumed, without deciding, the legitimacy of encouraging public beach access.170 It denied,
however, that the condition substantially advanced that objective.I7'
Much has been written about the confusion in the Nollan decision.
Before examining its ambiguity, it is important to emphasize what is
understandable about the decision. The Court simply did not disturb
the judicial attitude regarding the legitimacy of public regulation
across a broad range of interests. This was explicit in Scalia's language
in Lucas: "Our cases . . . have made clear however that a broad range
of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these requirements
[as to what constitutes a legitimate state interest]."172
165. Id.at828.
166. Id.
167. Id.at831.
168. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Stevens, I.,
dissenting). Stevens explained the Court's orientation in cases like Nollan differently: "[lln the
case of so-called 'development exactions,' we have paid special attention to the risk that particular
landowners might 'b[e] singled out to bear the burden' of a broader problem not of his own
making." Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825. 835 n.4 (1987)).
169. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). The Agins test states that a
regulation is constitutionally impermissible if it does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land. See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
170. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36.
171. Id. at 836-37.
172. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897. This assumption becomes a powerful and direct endorsement
of the "full scope of the State's police power." Id. The majority in Lucas reminds us that "where
[the] State 'reasonably conclude[s] that "the health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be
promoted by prohibiting particular contemplated uses of land,' compensation need not accompany prohibition," confirming the Court's approach in Penn Central. Id. (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)).
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In focusing on the connection between the easement imposed and
the public interest served, the Nollan majority is said by some to have
adopted a stricter standard of judicial review of takings cases.173Such a
conclusion, however, is not altogether clear from the opinion. The
Nollan opinion contrasts wording used in Agins to that used in Euclid,
even though both belong to the Arbitration category of cases. In Euclid, the Court examined whether the regulation had a "substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."174The
Agins Court required a regulation to "substantially advance [a] legitimate state interest[]."175Scalia, writing for the majority, used the different wording in Agins to craft an "essential nexus" test.176
Only anecdotal evidence suggests that Nollan adopted a stricter scrutiny standard of review, applicable to regulatory takings cases outside
the Undue Burden category. At most, Scalia used pointed and nondeferential language177to review the California Coastal Commission's
findings in N01lan.l~~
One can only infer a desire to use the essential
nexus more broadly by resorting to Scalia's subsequent opinions.'79
The ambiguity surrounding this issue is unfortunate. It may be seen by
some lower courts as leave to review with stricter scrutiny the extent to

173. See Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The N w Test of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission. 12 HARV.ENVTL.L. REV. 231, 242 (1988).
174. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,395 (1926).
175. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
176. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). Compare the language
in Agins and Euclid with that written over 100 years ago in Mugler v. Kansas:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the
public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects,
or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the
courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the [C]onstitution.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,661 (1887).
177. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("[TJhe lack of nexus between the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose t o something other than what it was.").
178. Id. at 838. Scalia refuted the Commission's arguments:
Rewriting the [Commission's] argument t o eliminate the play o n words makes clear that
there is nothing to it. It is quite impossible t o understand how a requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house.
Id.
179. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I, 18-19 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In Pennell, Justice Scalia would have entertained, as the majority did not,
the plaintiffs contention that the regulation did not properly advance a legitimate state interest.
In both Pennell and Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522. 1533-34 (1992), the majority of
the Court shows no inclination to engage in a substantive review of regulatory actions that have
been challenged as takings. This was reinforced again during the 1991 term in Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046, 1059-60 (1992). See generally Stan Millan, Is Clean Water Only for Those
at the Top?, 8 J. LANDUSE& ENWL.LAW 235 (1992).
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which a regulation furthers a legitimate state interest outside the undue
burden class of cases.180
It is noteworthy, however, that Scalia's opinion never used the
words "heightened scrutiny" or "stricter scrutiny" to characterize the
formulation of his standard. Indeed, the only reference in the opinion
to the Takings Clause appeared obliquely in the footnotes.1s1Further,
Scalia seemed to confuse due process and equal protection cases, and
the tests adopted in those contexts, with takings cases and their standards.Is2 Finally, there was no indication in his opinion that the Court
overruled cases like Euclid and Agins, or the deferential standards they
employ.
In articulating his test, Scalia used wording that belied its characterization as a new standard of judicial review, the so-called heightened
scrutiny standard.Is3He wrote, quite unremarkably, that: "The evident
constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as
the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated . . . [the regulation falls]."184 In the Court's opinion, there was
no relation at all between the condition imposed in Nollan and the
public purpose to be achieved.lS5In the end, it is the utter failure of the
regulation to achieve its objective that doomed the permit condition in
Nollan, not the Court's stricter scrutiny of the regulatory scheme.lS6
180. See, e.g., Kayden, supra note 67, at 301. Kayden interprets Parranto Bros., Inc. v. City
of New Brighton, 425 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), as applying stricter scrutiny to a
rezoning matter because of Nollan.
181. Nollan, 483 U.S.at 834-35, nn.3.4.
182. See Kayden, supra note 67, a t 314-15. Kayden explored this confusion:
Agins itself is a product of due process and equal protection cases. Agins cited Nectow-a due process, not a just compensation, case-as the exclusive source of its first
prong, thereby mixing due process apples with just compensation oranges. . . . The
connection is complete: As much as it may desire to construct an alternate genealogy,
Nollan is a direct descendant of Euclid and its due process-equal protection standard,
via Agins and Nectow.
Id.
183. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Andrea, Trespass at High Tide: The Supreme Court Gives
Heightened Scrutiny to a Slate Imposed Easement Requirement, 54 BROOK.L. REV. 991, 1011-20
(1988).
184. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 838 ("[Wle find that this case does not meet even the most untailored standards.").
186. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928). The Nectow Court uses a
standard and method of review similar to that applied by the Nollan Court:
We quite agree . . . that a court should not set aside the determination of public officers . . . unless it is clear that their action "has no foundation in reason and is a mere
arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the public
health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense."
Id. (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)). Applying this standard, the
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The best way to understand what Scalia did in Nollan in articulating
the essential nexus test is to look for his "situation sense."'s7 Scalia
characterized the California permit condition as "an out-and-out plan
of e ~ t o r t i o n . " 'It
~ ~imposed on the private owner the obligation to alThe majority feared that
low third parties to invade his posse~sion.'~~
the Nollans were singled out to bear an undue public burden.'% In this
context, the strong language and a longer look at the regulation becomes understandable. The argument that the opinion created a new
standard of judicial review applicable to all categories of reguIatory
takings cases, however, finds no support in the opinion. More importantly, such a view ignores the Court's repeated statement that there is
"no set formula" for deciding regulatory takings cases, but that it relies on ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circumstances of each case.Ig1
2. Fundamental Rights Cases

It would be hard to conjure a set of facts further removed from
those of an arbitration case, such as Agins, than those brought to the
bench in Seawall Associates v. City of New Y ~ r k . In
' ~ Agins,
~
provisions contained in a comprehensive zoning ordinance reduced the number of houses that could be built on the owner's parcel. In Seawall,
under a local law applicable only to certain properties, the owners were
required to maintain their single room occupancy buildings in habitable condition, to rehabilitate them when necessary, and to offer them
for rent to bona fide tenants, as defined by the regulation. The pur-

Nectow Court overturned the regulation in much the same manner as the majority overturned the
permit condition in Nollon.
187. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text. Scalia makes it clear that the unilateral

imposition of a public easement on private property would constitute a compensable taking, per
se, under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Nollan. 483 U.S. at 831-33. When such an
easement is imposed in the context of a n application for a discretionary permit, however, there is
no per se need for compensation. The "essential nexus" between the condition and the objective
to be secured by it is understandable and reasonable.
188. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D.Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
1981)). It is this phrase, which questions and recharacterizes the regulators' motive, perhaps more
than any other language in the opinion, that suggests that a higher level of judicial scrutiny is
being used to review the condition.
189. Nollan, 483 U.S.at 831 ("We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its
owner for private use, 'the right to exclude [others is] "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.""') (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982)).
190. Id. at 836 n.4 ("One of the principal purposes of the Takings Clause is 'to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."') (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,
49 (1960)).
191. Seesupra note 104.
192. 542 N.E.2d I059 (N.Y.1989).
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pose of the law was to preserve the stock of housing suitable to homeless individuals. Its effect was t o prevent these owners from
demolishing their buildings and constructing more valuable structures
in their place.
In the court's words, the regulation took away the owners' "quintessential rights to possess and exclude;"193took their right to "use their
properties as they see fit;"194and "negatively affect[ed] the owners'
right to dispose of their properties"195for "any sums approaching their
investments."'% In the court's opinion, the facts fell outside the ambit
of arbitration cases. The regulation so severely trammelled fundamental rights of property owners that a different judicial attitude could be
anticipated. Llewellyn's notions help anticipate the outcome in Seawall
once the facts are classified in this way.
The court wasted little effort discussing deferential standards of review. The court did discuss, however, the rights to use, possess, and
dispose of one's property, variously calling them the " t r a d i t i ~ n a l , " ~ ~ ~
and "classical"199 rights of property. The court quickly
concluded that, "[wlhere, as here, owners are forced to accept the occupation of their properties by persons not already in residence, the
resulting deprivation of rights in those properties is sufficient to constitute a physical taking for which compensation is required.
The majority in Seawall sustained its conclusion by selecting rules of
law from invasion cases, where private third parties were permitted access to a plaintiff's property. Most notably, the Court cited to Loretto ,201PumpefIy,202United States v. CausbyYzo3
and Kaiser. 204 Quoting
Loretto, the New York court noted that, "[tlhis right to exclude 'has
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an
owner's bundle of property rights."'205

193. Id. at 1065 n.5.
194. Id. at 1066.
195. Id.
1%. Id.
197. Id. at 1063.
198. Id. at 1062.
199. Id. at 1063.
200. Id. at 1063. As if to demonstrate the elasticity of the subcategories of undue burden
cases, the court characterized the facts as constituting an "enterprise" case, a "fundamental
rights" case, and an "invasion" case. Id. at 1065, 1070; see also supra note 161.
201. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
202. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
203. 328 U.S. 256 (1946); see also United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1947)
(unintentional flooding).
204. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
205. Seawall Assocs. v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S.at 435).
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Having disposed of the local law as a deprivation of fundamental
property rights, a "per se taking," the court also considered whether it
was a "regulatory taking." For this purpose, it used the traditional
Agins two-pronged test. In applying the test, however, the court used
language unfamiliar to those accustomed to reading arbitration case
decisions. First, the court took the case out of the arbitration class:
[Tlhe constitutional guarantee against uncompensated takings is
violated when the adjustment of rights for the public good becomes
so disproportionate that it can be said that the governmental action is
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."206

As a regulatory takings case, this analysis ventured into the Undue
Burden category, where the reciprocity of advantage present in arbitration cases is absent.
Second, the court held that the taking of a "discrete twig out of (the
owner's) fee simple bundle of
can effectively deny an owner
economical use of his property. This, in itself, fails the second prong
of the Agins test.208The Seawall opinion therefore dramatically contrasts with the proof required of challengers in arbitration cases w h e r ~
land owners must show conclusively that the property has no reasonable use. The Seawall court did not discuss the economic impact of the
regulation. Instead, it grafted its fundamental rights violation arguments into the second prong of the Agins test and concluded that it "is
inescapable that the effect of the provisions is unconstitutionally to deprive owners of economically viable use of their properties."209
Third, the court adopted "close nexus" and "heightened judicial
scrutiny"210standards, attributing them to Nollan. The court applied
these strict standards to the first prong of the test: whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest. The court never
questioned the appropriateness of the public objective of housing the
homeless. Instead, it doubted that the law advanced the objective, noting that the city's own study acknowledged that the preservation of
such units "would do little to resolve the homeless ~risis."~"
Fourth, it appears that the majority reversed the burden of proof
employed in arbitration cases and the "fairly debatable" standard of
Id. at 1065 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.40.49 (1960)).
Id. at 1067 (quoting Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV.L. REV. 1165, 1233 (1967)).
208. Seesupra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
209. Seawall. 542 N.E.2dat 1068.
210. Id.
211. Id.
206.
207.
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deference articulated by Euclid. The court noted that "[tlhe heavy exactions imposed by [the law] must 'substantially advance' its putative
The court did not find that the
purpose of relieving h~melessness."~~~
law met this "close nexus" requirement.
The result of this New York decision is understandable as an undue
burden case. Like the Lucas bench, the New York Court of Appeals
sensed that it faced a case belonging to a "categor[y] of regulatory
action" where compensation may be awarded "without case-specific
inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint."213
This view echoes Scalia's suggestion in Lucas that "there are plainly a
number of noneconomic interests in land whose impairment will invite
exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings Clause."214 Primary
among these noneconomic interests is the fundamental right to exclude
others. As the court in Loretto noted, "[past] cases uniformly have
found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only
minimal economic impact on the owner."215
Does the Seawall decision make sense, however, if applied to other
classes of takings cases? The state court referenced the owner's right to
"use their properties as they see fit"216as a fundamental right of property ownership. If Seawall is applied literally outside the undue burden
context, zoning setback requirements, which clearly and substantially
limit private property use, would become takings without regard to
their economic impact or the public benefit achieved. The Seawall
court clearly did not envision this result. This difficultly illustrates the
importance of confining regulatory takings holdings to the factual situation out of which they arise. Moreover, it suggests that the historic,
deferential standards of review still apply outside the Undue Burdens
category.217

212. Id. at 1069.
213. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992).
214. Id. at 2895 n.3 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
436 (1982). an invasion case).
215. Loretto. 458 U.S. at 434-35. Compare id. with Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct.
1522, 1530 (1992) (noting that a governmentally compelled physical occupation "may be relevant
t o a regulatory taking argument, as it may be one factor a reviewing court would wish t o consider
in determining whether the ordinance unjustly imposes a burden on the petitioners").
216. Seowall. 542 N.E.2d at 1066.
217. See Birnbaum v. New York, 541 N.E.2d 23 (N.Y. 1989). This case was decided by the
New York Court of Appeals one month prior to SeawaN. In Birnbaum, the private property
owner was prevented from closing her nursing home by state regulation, during which time she
incurred operating losses. The regulation prevented the owner from using her property as she saw
fit; it arguably prevented her from disposing of it and compelled the continuation of the business.
That this impact on fundamental property rights does not compel the court t o find a compensable
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Public Values Cases

In Yee v. City of Escondido, after discussing undue burden cases,
Justice O'Connor defined a broad second class of regulatory takings
cases "where the government merely regulates the use of property."218
In this second category, which certainly includes the Arbitration category discussed above, further classification may be merited.219It is in
this second category that a takings determination "entails complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government
actions. ""O
Some commentators attempt to divide this second group of cases
into discrete categories by suggesting that courts weigh the importance
of the public objective to gauge the fundamental fairness of the regulatory scheme."' Although debatable, this assertion does find support in
some cases. In Agins, for example, the question of whether a regulation constituted a taking "requires a weighing of private and public
interests."222Further, the California Supreme Court upheld on remand
a regulation in First English based on its measure of the importance of
the public objective achieved compared with the degree of private burden."' The court alluded t o a hierarchy of interests served by the police
power with preservation of life at the top and the pursuit of aesthetic
values near the
Scalia's opinions also reflect interestingly on the issue of whether
there is a hierarchy of public interests in regulatory takings cases. In
taking is apparent in Chief Justice Wachtler's opinion, which found that no taking occurred. In
the context of a heavily regulated industry, the facts suggested to the court that the owner was not
unfairly treated; indeed, she reasonably could have expected such a prohibition. The state regulatory scheme was designed to provide and maintain a system of health care for the people of the
area. This, added t o her reasonable expectations, took the case out of the Undue Burden category. In this context, the same court that decided Seawall was deferential to the state regulatory
scheme, did not scrutinize heavily the reasoning advanced by the state in favor of the regulation,
and affirmed that a takings analysis generally requires an ad hoc, factual inquiry, citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
218. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1526 (1992); see supra notes 130-34 and
accompanying text.
219. Yee, 112 S . Ct. at 1526 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-25). Justice O'Connor
writes that in this second category, "compensation is required only if considerations such as the
purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the economic use suggest
that the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be
borne by the public as a whole." Id.
220. Id.
221. See Charles L. Siemon, Who Owns Cross Creek?, 5 J. LANDUSE & ENVTL.
L. 323, 362
(1990) ("It appears . . . that the willingness of the courts to find that a regulation has gone 'too
far' declines as the importance of the purpose increases.").
222. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980).
223. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893
(Ct. App. 1989). cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
224. Id. at 904.
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Lucas, Scalia confirmed that "a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations," encompassing the "full scope of the State's
police power," including objectives such as "historic preservation,"
constitute legitimate state interests.22s Yet, in Nollan, Scalia assumed
without deciding that the Commission's interest in preserving the public's ability to see the beach constituted a legitimate state interest.226If
the visual, aesthetic and recreational interests promoted by the Commission's regulations were legitimate interests, equal in importance to
all other public interests, why did Scalia take this approach? His reticence implies that some public interests may be different from others
when they are weighed under Agins.
rationale explaining why
On examination, a more ~omfortable22~
courts use more caution in the Public Values category is found in the
central focus of regulatory takings cases on whether an owner has been
singled out unfairly.228Determining when an owner has been singled
out requires an examination of whether regulatory impacts are distributed broadly or narrowly. Regulations that restrict the use of property
for aesthetic or historic purposes tend to fall on a few owners and yet
benefit the public in
For this reason, regulations burdening
relatively few owners may receive more extensive analysis.230
When regulations burden a few in the interest of many, judges may
engage in a lengthier analysis and consider a variety of additional fac225. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992) (citing Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125, 133-34 n.30 (1978); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 (1987)).
226. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835.
227. The proposition that courts use varying levels of scrutiny to review the regulation's purpose is at odds with the deference uniformly paid by courts t o legislative determinations. It suggests that judges second guess the legitimacy of state interests, as determined by elected legislators.
The cases suggest only that courts will review with particular care the means chosen to accomplish
such interests, not the legitimacy of the interest itself. This "stricter scrutiny" is limited, almost
exclusively, to cases where an undue burden on a particular owner is effected by the regulation.
228. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Local governments, historically, have developed three types of aesthetic regulations: architectural review regulation, controls on billboards and signs, and regulation of junkyards. By
definition, a relatively few properties owners are burdened by such provisions in the interests of
benefiting the public at large.
230. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, I47 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[New York City] imposed a substantial cost on less than one-tenth of one
percent of the buildings in New York City for the general benefit of all its people. It is exactly this
imposition of general costs on a few individuals at which the 'taking' protection is directed.").
Any doubt about the validity of such regulations should be resolved by Scalia's majority opinion
in Lucas. Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme Court has regularly upheld regulations "on the
ground that the restrictions were reasonably related t o the implementation of a policy-not unlike
historic preservation-expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897 (quoting Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 133-34
11.30).
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tors. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New Y ~ r k , for
~~'
example, the Court looked to several matters to determine whether a
taking occurred, including the character of the governmental action, its
economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations. The owner in Penn Central contested a historic
district regulation that imposed a limitation on the owner's ability to
build in its air rights.232Effectively, the owner was denied a permit to
construct a fifty-five story office tower over Grand Central Station in
New York City. The Court adopted a multifactor balancing approach
in affirming the regulation.233In the process, it:
1. exhibited sensitivity to the laws in "all 50 States and over
500 m ~ n i c i p a l i t i e s " that
~ ~ ~ require or encourage historic
preservation;
2. noted the comprehensiveness of the New York City
ordinance;
3. found no onerous requirements in the regulation;
4. concentrated on a transfer of development rights feature
designed to provide some compensation for the limitation on
development rights; and
5. referenced "special mechanisms . . . t o ensure that
designation does not cause economic hardship. "*"

Citing familiar case law,236the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
law embodied the requisite reciprocity of advantage because of the
comprehensive nature of of the New York City historic preservation
program. Justice Brennan's decision is replete with deference to the
New York State Legislature, the New York City Council, the Landmarks Preservation Commission, and the decisions of the New York
trial and appellate courts. Although the lengthy analysis considered
several factors, the Court, in the end, sensed that the principle of generality was not violated and the results were fundamentally fair.237
231. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
232. Id. at 109.
233. Id. at 124.
234. Id. at 106.
235. Id. at 112.
236. Id. at I23 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
237. Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104 with Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ind. 1989). In Indiana Coal Council, the court deferred t o a regulation designed to prevent "damage to important historic, cultural, scientific, and
esthetic values and natural systems." Id. at 1002. It declined to find that the prohibition of strip
mining, to prevent damage to such values, was a taking. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d at
1004. The court imposed a heavy burden of proof on the challenger. Id. at 1003. The court de-
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Contrast this to United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philad e l ~ h i a where
, ~ ~ ~the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the City
of Philadelphia's Historic Preservation law violated the state constitution's analogue to the Takings Clause. The Court saw in the regulation
the degree of private burden that the Seawall majority found in the
New York City's scheme to preserve residential buildings for the homeless. The Pennsylvania law gave the Historic Commission
almost absolute control over the property, including the physical
details and the uses to which it could be put. Further, the historic
designation imposed upon the owner an affirmative duty to preserve
the building, at the exclusive expense of the owner, in the . . . style
and appearance mandated by the C o r n m i s s i ~ n . ~ ~ ~

The tone of the decision made it clear that the Court sensed that it
faced a reguiation that simply had gone too far. This decision was influenced by:
1. the numerous procedural steps, some of them costly to
the owner, required for a permit to alter or demolish a
designated building;
2. the minimal repairs that an owner could make without a
permit;
3. the duty to preserve the building in its historic state;
4. the imposition of criminal penalties for noncompliance;
and
5. the extensive controls over interior space.

The exasperation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is palpable in
its reference to a comment by counsel for the plaintiff, undisputed by
the Commission, that "the owner would be legally obligated to obtain
permission from the Commission to move a mirror from one wall to
another."240In these observations, one senses a court classifying facts
that will place the case beyond the reach of the Arbitration category. It
should be no surprise, therefore, that the court found an absence of
clined to use heightened scrutiny. doubting that the Nollan court articulated such a standard and
confining its use, if it exists, to cases where the government requires an "actual conveyance of
property [as] a condition of the lifting of a land use restriction." Id. at 1005. The court found
that no intrusion amounting to an actual conveyance was involved and that the regulation survived the "substantial relationship" test. See generally id. at 1005 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S.365 (1926)).
238. 595 A.2d 6, 13-14 (Pa. 1991), reh'ggranred, id.
239. Id. at 11.
240. Id.
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reciprocity of advantage in the Philadelphia law: "Here, Philadelphia
. . . is forcing the owner of that property t o bear a public burden,
ostensibly to enhance the quality of life of the public as a whole. . . .
This is a burden that, in fairness and justice, should be borne by
a11."24!
In this context, where the private burden becomes too great, the
Court used a less deferential standard: "If after investigating there is
doubt as to whether the statute is enacted for a recognized police object, or if, conceding its purpose, its exercise goes too far, it then becomes the judicial duty [to] . . . declare the given exercise of the police
power invalid."242 The court thus held the law unconstitutional insofar
as it authorized the historic designation of private property without the
consent of the owner.
The different outcomes in these two cases, both involving historic
preservation ordinances, demonstrate the importance of the facts of
each controversy. Both Courts engaged in relatively lengthy analyses of
the regulations and the burdens they impose. In Penn Central, the
facts led the U.S. Supreme Court to conclude that the burdens were
not unreasonable. Its treatment of the regulation, albeit extensive, was
ultimately deferential. In United Artist, the Pennsylvania court sensed
a fundamental unfairness imposed by the Philadelphia ordinance. The
Pennsylvania statute appeared more detailed and directive than its New
York counterpart. With its sense of fairness offended, the court found
a taking under Pennsylvania state law.

D. Public Injury Prevention Cases
When the purpose of land use regulations is to protect the public
health or safety, they often impose burdens on a limited number of
properties that exhibit the undesirable or offensive effect. In this respect, such regulations often resemble those enacted to protect public
values, such as aesthetics, history or heritage. Regulations that prevent
uses injurious to the public, however, are significantly different. When
the intent to prevent public harm is clear and the potential for public
injury inheres in the proscribed use of the regulated properties, courts
are less likely t o question the regulators. The essential fairness is more
apparent because the common law historically prevented uses of private property that injure the

241.

Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 12 (quoting White's Appeal, 134 A. 409, 41 1 (1926)).
243. Sic utere ruo ut alienurn non laedas, "[u]se your own property in such a manner as not to
LAW DICTIONARY
1380 (6th ed. 1990);see also Munn v. Illinois,
injure that of another." BLACK'S
242.
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There is no dispute that there is a "nuisance exception" to the application of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As
recently as 1987, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this
principal in Keystone,244where the exception was described as extending to the prohibition of harmful uses of land that are "akin to a public nuisance,"245 "similar to [a] public n~isance[],"2~~
or "nuisancelike."247In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the government's "unquestioned authority" to forbid uses that injure others, but
disagreed over how broadly the exception applied to exempt regulations from application of the Takings Clause.248
The debate over the breadth of the nuisance exception defies easy
resolution simply because the task of defining a nuisance is so difficult.
Henry of Bracton, the first codifier and commentator on the Common
Law of England, wrote that "nuisances are truly infinite."249 Blackstone agreed. He defined public nuisance as "a species of offenses
against the public order and economical regimen of the state; being
either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the king's subjects,
or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires."250
In L u ~ a s , the
~ ~ Court
'
noted that the legitimacy of land use regulations does not rest on whether they prevent "harmful or noxious
uses."252Instead, the Court found that the power to regulate land is
coterminous with the "full scope of the State's police power."253 Having eliminated any doubt about the breadth of legitimate state interests
for regulating land use, the majority provided a new setting for the use
of the nuisance exception.

94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877) (stating that government may require "each citizen t o so conduct himself,
and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another"); Mugler v. Kansas,. 123 U.S.
623, 665 (1887) (stating that long ago it was recognized that "all property in this country is held
under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious t o the community").
244. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The majority
interpreted a Pennsylvania statute that prevented surface subsidence by limiting the mining of coal
in the support estate, below the surface, as a nuisance prevention statute. Id. at 474. The Court
stated: "[Tlhe Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare." Id. at 485.
245. Id. at 488.
246. Id. at 492.
247. Id. at 491 n.20.
248. Id. at 512. Rehnquist argued that the doctrine "is a narrow exception allowing the government t o prevent 'a misuse or illegal use."' Id. (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86
(191 1)).
249. HENRYDE BRACTON,ON THE LAWSAND CUSTOMSOF ENGLAND(Samuel E. Thorne
trans., 1968).
250. 4 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
*166-67 (spelling modernized).
251. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
252. Id. at 2897.
253. Id.
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Recall that in Lucas the majority agreed that a regulation can take
"all economically beneficial use of land," if the proscribed use could
nuisance."254On
have been prohibited under "the State's law of
remand, the South Carolina courts must determine whether the "background principles of [the State's] nuisance and property law"255prevent Lucas from building permanent structures on his two beachfront
lots. In most states, determining what constitutes a nuisance depends
as much on ad hoc, factual inquiries as regulatory takings analysis.
Both look to the circumstances of the case, the location of the property, and the insights of an evolving society. By adding this state law
nuisance inquiry to the standards applicable to this narrow category of
regulatory takings cases, Lucas gave courts a factor to interpret that is
as vague and hard to apply as the "essential nexus" test in N ~ l l a n . ~ ~ ~
In future regulatory takings cases, the inquiry as to whether a regulated use could have been enjoined under state nuisance law should be
limited to "total takings"2s7 cases, where the regulation prohibits all
economic or productive use of land. Since these cases constitute a tiny
fraction of such disputes, one must question the relevance of the nuisance exception to the resolution of the vast remainder of cases where
some use of the challenger's property remains.
A regulatory takings analysis essentially invites an inquiry into the
fairness of the regulatory scheme. Upon proof that particular properties are singled out for regulation because of the potentially injurious
nature of the prohibited use, the fairness of the regulation becomes
more obvious. In this context, as opposed to the total takings setting,
courts are not likely to "weigh with nicetywzs8whether the regulation
prevents a common law nuisance, nor are they required to do so by the
Lucas decision. The more the regulator shows that the regulation operates to prevent a public injury, the more judges will sense its essential
fairness and not classify the regulation as a compensable taking. In
such situations, a court will be more likely to sense that a regulation
imposes burdens fairly if it concludes that the primary purpose of the
regulation is to eliminate an injurious use. Injurious uses could include
nuisances, nuisance-like activities, or conduct akin to a nuisance.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently decided a case relevant to
a
this analysis. In Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Cornrnis~ion,~~~
farm owner, relying on Nollan, challenged a commission regulation

...

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 2900.
Id. at 2901-02.
Seesupra notes 173-91 and accompanying text.
SeeLucas, 112S.Ct.at2901.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,280 (1928).
593 A.2d 251 (N.J.1991).
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limiting development of his 217 acre farm to five homes, restricting the
rest of the land to agricultural uses, and requiring a perpetual deed
restriction on the property's use to that effect.260The farm was located
in the New Jersey Pine Barrens, an area of unique ecological feature~.~'
The clash of interests in this case, placing it in the growth area of the
was as dramatic as the conflict in Lucas. The plaintiff's land
was located in one of the most rapidly developing areas in the country,
situated near "the midpoint of the emerging megalopolis that extends
~ ~ Pine Barrens contained numerous
from Boston to R i ~ h m o n d . "The
endangered plant and animal species. The lands also overlaid an aquifer constituting one of the largest unused sources of pure water in the
world. The fragile ecology of the area also made it the first natural
resource area protected by the Natural Reserve Program created by the
.~
and state legislation created a planning comU.S. C ~ n g r e s sFederal
mission for the Pinelands. Using its zoning powers, the commission
adopted a comprehensive management plan and land use regulations,
including those which restricted the plaintiff's parcel.
The operating technique of the court in reviewing the plaintiff's taking challenge is instructive. First, it referenced the Arbitration category
of cases, calling the commission's regulatory scheme "fundamentally a
regime of zoning."26s The court noted that regulations from the Arbitration category must meet the demands of the two-pronged Agins
test.266The court stated, however, that when the impacts of a regulation amount to "particularized restrictions on property with special
characteristic^,"^^ the judicial demands of the legislation "become
more elaborateMM8
and require an analysis of several factors.269

260. Id. at 253, 256.258-59.
261. Id. at 253.
262. See LLEWELLYN,
supra note 91.
263. Gardner. 593 A.2d at 254.
264. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92 Stat. 3492 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. 8 471i (1988)).
265. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257.
266. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). A zoning scheme "must substantially advance legitimate state interests, and it cannot deny an owner all economically viable use of
the land." Gardner, 593 A.M at 257.
267. Gardner, 593 A.M at 256.
268. Id. at 257; see ako Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987)
("We are inclined to be particularly carqful about the [term 'substantial'] where the actual conveyance of property is [required], . . . since in that context there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement.") (emphasis added).
269. Gardner, 593 A.2d at 257 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
loll, 124-28 (1978)).
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Because the challenged regulatory regime involved particularized restrictions on property with special characteristics, the court engaged in a
lengthy analysis of whether it furthered legitimate state interests or denied the plaintiff all economically viable use of his land. In undertaking this analysis, the court began with its observation that the
legislation "advances a valid public purpose by preventing or reducing
harm to the public."270 The court reached this conclusion without reference to common law nuisance principles.
The court cited a New Jersey precedent for the proposition that "[a]
property owner 'has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of
others."'27' Without referencing the "essential nexus" test, the court
disposed of the plaintiff's Nollan challenge by finding that the regulation "does not constitute a burden that is unrelated to the essential
purposes of the regulatory scheme."272 Finally, the court concluded
that, by allowing the existing agricultural uses to continue and permitting the development of five houses, the owner could enjoy gainful use
of the property and that there was "no showing that the economic impact of the regulations interfere[d] with distinct investment-backed expectations. "273
The decision, though lengthy and careful in its analysis, deferred to
the regulator and imposed a burden on the challenger to prove that the
regulation violated the Agins test. In the public injury or arbitration
context - both referenced in Gardner - this is the classic and timehonored approach of the judiciary.

Recognizing the different categories of takings claims helps one understand how judges use their discretion to resolve disputes. Understanding the operating techniques may assist regulators in designing
legislation that will resist judicial scrutiny. This section suggests methods by which regulators may apply the foregoing discussion of the var270. Id. at 258.
271. Id. (quoting Usdin v. Environmental Protection Dep't, 414 A.2d 280, 288 (Law Div.
1980). afyd, 430 A.M 949 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)).
272. Id. at 259. The court noted that the Pine Barrens deed restriction requirement imposed a
use restriction, similar to a zoning restriction, not a physical access easement or invasion as found
in NoNan. In this context, it applied the standard test of whether the "development limitations
substantially advanced legitimate state interests." Id. (citing Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So.
2d 1030 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).
273. Id.at26l.
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ious takings categories and create fair, equitable, and above all
constitutional regulations.
Judicial Leeways and Constraints
The flexibility retained by judges in this field leads to considerable
frustration on the part of regulators and property owners alike. In Lucas, the majority of the state supreme court sustained the regulation as
preventing public injury, conferring special status on "this kind of regulation" using common law terms: "no individual has a right to use
his property so as to create a nuisance or otherwise harm others."274
The dissent characterized the same regulation as a public values case,
one that merely promoted tourism and therefore should not withstand
Fifth Amendment analysis.27sThe U.S. Supreme Court majority opinion flatly labeled the facts as falling in the Undue Burden category
where compensation must be awarded "without case-specific inquiry
into the public interest advanced. "276
Does Lucas teach us that regulators and property owners are subject
to the whim of judges who simply decide cases according to their life
experien~e?~"
Llewellyn argued that judges are guided by constraining
principles and techniques and have leeway in deciding cases, particularly where social values are in flux.278He suggested that the facts lead
judges to classify a dispute and that from such classifications they
search for the applicable rules of law. In the regulatory taking field
there are four types of fact patterns, classified as: Arbitration category
cases,279Undue Burden category case^,^ Public Values category
cases,281and Public Injury category cases.B2 In these categories, there
are some constraints on the judiciary and some leeways.
A.

274. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 404 S.E.2d 895, 898-99 (S.C. 1991) (citing
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987)). rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
275. Id. at 906.
276. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886,2893 (1992).
277. There is validity to the observation that reviewing courts have great discretion to define
the issues and thereby predetermine the result. Seesupm note 101. This happened in Nollan where
the U.S. Supreme Court focused on the weakest of several Coastal Commission justifications for

the lateral easement-viewshed protection-and then proceeded to find no "essential nexus" between the easement and that objective. The material that follows discusses both these leeways and
the influences that constrain judicial discretion. These factors also help explain how discretion and
constraints influence the way judges behave. Would, for example, the majority in Nollan have
used its discretion to define the issues as it did if it had not been dealing with an undue burden
case involving an invasion of the owner's possession?
278. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
279. See supm part 1V.A.
280. See supra part 1V.B.
281. See supra part 1V.C.
282. See supra part 1V.D.
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In certain ways, judges seem constrained. First, they are committed,
in all four categories of cases, to search for fundamental fairness in the
challenged regulation. Second, they make two demands of all regulations, following the Agins prescription: the regulation must substantially advance a legitimate public interest and must not take all
economically viable use of the property from the owner.283Third,
judges very seldom question a legislative finding that a particular objective is a legitimate subject justifying public regulation of private
rights. Fourth, in determining whether the property owner is unfairly
burdened, they will search for reciprocity of advantage and whether
similar properties are treated in the same way. Finally, they will put the
initial burden of proving the unconstitutionality of the regulation on
the challenger. In the Undue Burden category this burden requires only
that the owner show an invasion of the possession or that there has
been a total taking.
In other ways, judges enjoy Ieeways that they are more likely to use
where they sense that relatively few owners have been singled out to
bear a burden in the public interest. Since public benefit and public
injury cases tend to involve particularized restrictions on properties
with special characteristics, judges tend to proceed with greater care
and to analyze, in more detail, whether these particular burdens are
justified. The cases have not articulated the precise levels of judicial
scrutiny applied in these cases. The court may engage in an ad hoc,
factual inquiry of sufficient intensity to satisfy itself that the regulation
is essentially fair. In such cases, the relationship between the regulatory
objective and the means chosen to accomplish it may be examined
more carefully. If judges find that the regulation prevents uses of
property that are injurious to the public, the fairness of the regulation
is more evident than when the regulation merely promotes public values or sensibilities. In these latter cases, judges are more likely to engage in multi-factor balancing of the public and private interests
affected by the reguIation. Nonetheless, judges are not constrained to
use any particular set of factors, nor are they required to balance or
weigh them in any preordained way.
The sum of the U.S. Supreme Court regulatory takings case law is
that the vast majority of regulations will be undisturbed by the courts,
simply because judges are trained to defer to legislative determinations,
absent a showing of essential unfairness which is absent in most cases.
The much touted ambiguity of the case law and the use of stricter standards arise in very unusual fact situations such as the total takings con--

283. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.255,260-61 (1980).
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text, an invasion of possessory rights, or a rather obvious trammelling
of fundamental rights. Generally, this ambiguity and these stricter
rules apply only to similar fact patterns.

B. Principle of Maximum Fairness
The practical lesson to be learned from the foregoing analysis is that
land use regulators should strive to achieve essential fairness rather
than relax with the assumption that their regulations are presumed
valid. For a variety of reasons, those who draft regulations should follow a principle of maximum fairness and engage themselves in the exercises undertaken by the courts in close cases. The following
principles should guide their inquiry:
1. A regulatory regime that is generally fair might seem
unduly burdensome as applied to a particular owner, triggering
more careful judicial analysis, a takings finding, and public
cost and embarrassment.
2. Because judges do enjoy leeways in this field, and the
rules in one category of cases can bleed through to other
categories, there is no guarantee that a given set of facts will be
placed in a particular category.
3. By proceeding fairly in regulating land uses, situations
that lead courts and commentators to use phrases like "outand-out plan of extortion"2s4 and "predatory regulatory
practices"285can be avoided along with the perception that land
use regulation, in general, has gone too far. Unless this
happens, victories in the courtroom can be negated in
legislative chambers. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991,
pending in t h e S e n a t e a n d s u p p o r t e d by t h e Bush
administration, would subject all federal regulations to a
"takings impact analysis" that would constrain the issuance of
needed and useful r e g u l a t i ~ n s Such
. ~ legislative proposals are

284. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n. 483 U.S. 825.837 (1987).
285. Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipl Zoning Practices: Changing the Presumption of
Constitutionality in the Wake of the "Takings Trilogy" 44 A m . L. REV.65,92 (1991).
286. The Private Property Rights Act of 1991. S. 50, ]OM. Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see supra
note 92. Bills requiring state agencies to conduct a takings impact analyses prior to the issuance of
new regulations have been introduced in state legislatures in at least the following states: Alabama, see S. 84, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ala. Acts; Arizona, sw H.R. 2236, S. 1005, 40th Leg., 2d Sess.,
1992 Ariz. Sess. Laws; California, see A. 1557. Reg. Sess.. 1991 Cal. Stat. (applicable to Fish and
Game Commission; died in committee); Delaware. see S. 130. 136th Leg.. Reg. Sess., 1991 Del.
Laws; Kentucky, see H.R. 768, Reg. Sess., 1992 Ky. Acts; Maine, see S. 664, 115th Leg., 2d
Sess., 1992 Me. Laws; Missouri, see H.R. 1721.86th Leg., 2d Sess., 1992 Mo. Laws; New Hamp-
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less likely to succeed if there is no perceived need for their
protections.
4. Productive use of land is respected by the law.
Regulations that intrude on such uses only so far as necessary
to accomplish their environmental or other public objective are
less vulnerable to invalidation by judges trained to respect
private rights as we11 as the discretion of legislatures.
If regulators ignore this call for maximum fairness they run the risk
of offending the sensibility of the court and having their determinations scrutinized more rigorously. Regulations designed to be fair are
less likely to offend the court's "sense of justice." If a reviewing court
senses a balanced regulation, it is less likely to conclude that the Takings Clause is implicated, and will tend to adopt a deferential posture.

I.

Supporting Justification

Land use regulations not based on adequate findings to justify their
private burdens will tend to throw judges back on their own sense of
fairness. For this reason, regulations should always contain detailed
findings of fact that support their adoption and impacts. As Justice
Scalia counselled, however, this needs "to be more than an exercise in
In justifying any regulation, or analyzcleverness and irnaginati~n."~~'
ing whether it is constitutional, there are several key questions:
1 . Legitimate Objective. Is the public objective pursued by
t h e regulatory scheme clearly stated and convincingly
supported?
2. Nexus. Is the close connection between the regulatory
means and the burdens imposed obvious on the face of the
regulation?
3. Reciprocity of Advantage. Is it possible to characterize
the regulatory scheme as an arbitration matter? Are the
burdens of the regulation shared by a relatively large number
of property owners including all similarly situated owners? Are
there any speciaI benefits from the reguIation that run to those

shire, see H.R. 681, ISM Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 N.H. Laws; New York, see A. 9110, 214th Leg.,
2d Sess., 1992 N.Y. Laws; Oklahoma, see H.R. 1495,43d Leg., 2d Sess., 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws;
South Carolina, see S. 188, 1230 & 1254, 1991 S.C. Acts; Vermont, see P. 14, 61st Leg., 1st Sess.,
1992 Vt. Laws; Washington, see S. 5122, 5539 & 6201, 52d Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 Wash. Laws.
287. Nollon, 483 U.S. at 841 ("We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more
than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and
imagination."); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898 11.12
(1992). Note that this precaution was articulated in Nollan, an undue burden case.
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owners? If the regulation burdens a.relatively few owners, is
there a convincing justification?
4. Undue Burden. Does the regulation effect, directly or
indirectly, an invasion of the owner's possessory rights? Is
there any other alternative to accomplishing the regulatory end
that does not involve an invasion? If the regulation effects a
result that appears to constitute a traditional government
enterprise,288such as the preservation of open space, is there a
convincing rationale for regulating rather than taking the
property under eminent domain? Is there a possibility that the
regulation will prevent all productive use of particular
properties? If so, could such use be prevented under the state's
nuisance law? Does the regulation have hardship exceptions to
prevent total takings? If not, is their absence justified?

C. Regulatory Takings and the Comprehensive Plan
Judges will have fewer occasions to second guess regulators when it
is obvious that considerable and comprehensive planning went into the
structure of the regulatory program. This is illustrated in Gardner v.
New Jersey Pinelands C o r n m i s ~ i o nwhere
, ~ ~ ~ federal2g0and s t a t e 1legislation designed to protect the New Jersey Pine Barrens led to the creation of a comprehensive scheme of regulation. The legislation
addressed a considerable number of factors, despite its primary focus
on the preservation of the fragile ecosystem. For example, the state
authorized the designation of "protection areas" for the promotion of
agriculture and "appropriate patterns of compatible residential, com~ Pinelands Commission
mercial, and industrial d e ~ e l o p m e n t . " The
adopted land use regulations, based on and consistent with a comprehensive management plan, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior of the United States. In this regime, the legislature and its
regulatory agency arbitrate a full range of public concerns and private
interests .293
In Gardner, the court quickly saw the analogy between this regulatory approach and zoning: "Because the Pinelands scheme is funda-

288.
289.
290.
291.
1991).
292.
293.

See supra note 161.
593 A.2d 251,257 (N.J. 1991).
National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C.O 471i (1988).
The New Jersey Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT.ANN. QQ 13:18A-1 to -29 (West
Gardner, 593 A.2d at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
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mentally a regime of zoning, takings doctrine dealing with zoning is
~ ~ court noted, as well, that the regulation
particularly r e l e ~ a n t . " The
had a particular impact on property with special characteristics. This
placed the Pine Barren legislation in a category of "complex, specialpurpose regulations"29s where the demands of the judicial takings analysis may become more elaborate. The tone of the court's analysis in
this dual context, however, remained respectful of the legislative determinations.
Under the Pine Barrens program, the large-scale reciprocity of advantage in the regulatory scheme inheres in the concern for economic
as well as ecological interests, paralleling the breadth of concern of
zoning itself. As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Lucas,
"[plerhaps the most familiar application of this principle of generality
arises in zoning cases. A diminution in value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to constitute a taking if it is part of a general
and comprehensive land-use plan. "296
Public agencies adopt and enforce many land use regulations that
are either parochial or narrow in their focus. Local governments tend
to be parochial, limited in their concern to property and affairs within
. ~ and federal environmental regutheir geographical b o ~ n d a r i e s State
lations tend to focus narrowly on issues such as air quality, an estuary,
an aquifer, specific wetlands, a scenic river, or a toxic waste site. When
these regulations stray from public injury prevention, as the minority
of the South Carolina Supreme Court found in Lucm, they risk invalidation under takings scrutiny. This risk is abated, however, if they are
part of a more comprehensive approach such as that found in Gardner. Judges more easily find that regulations carrying out the objectives of a comprehensive plan accord with the principle of generality,
confer reciprocal advantages, fall into the arbitration' class, and merit
the full deference of the reviewing court.
With single-purpose regulations, emanating from state and federal
agencies, and with parochial local regulations, it is less clear that the
public interest is fully considered and that the regulatory scheme, in
294. Id. at 257.
295. Id.
2%. L u w v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 141. Luces is properly distinguished from Gardner by the fact that the
Pine Barrens regulations left the owner some discrete and valuable uses, while the Beachfront
Management Act in Lucm did not. This difference can be perceived in the structure of the legislative scheme: the Beachfront Management Act is more narrowly focused on preserving the fragile
ecosystem, while the Pine Barrens regulations, although preservation-minded, focused more
broadly on allowing economic uses. while still preserving the ecosystem.
297. See Golden v. Ramapo. 285 N.E.2d 291, 299 (N.Y.1972) ("[C]ommunity autonomy in
land use controls has come under increasing attack
because of its pronounced insularism.").

...
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balance, bestows reciprocal benefits as broadly as possible. The lack of
order in a system of uncoordinated regulations, some parochial, some
narrow in focus, is itself burdensome. Developers often face multipleagency reviews by different levels of government. Obviously, a comprehensive and coordinated system of land use regulation furthers the
essential fairness sought by courts in examining regulations.
The relatively recent appearance of comprehensive state-wide land
use legislation, coinciding with the quickening pace of regulatory takings challenges, is intriguing.298Such initiatives, often called growth
management statutes, generally require that state and local regulations
be tied to comprehensive land use plans. The plans articulate statewide land use objectives and local plans must relate to or be consistent
with those objectives. The plans place emphasis on need analysis, data
gathering, and the integration of that information. Information is often assembled at the regional level and regulations are tied to meeting
regional needs. The plans that result tend to be comprehensive in subject matter and geographical focus, truly arbitrating a broad range of
public and private interests in a uniform fashion. These plans in turn
justify specific land use regulations at the local level and guide the issuance of single-purpose regulations by state agencies. Ultimately, they
coordinate the expenditure of local, state, and federal funds on capital
infrastructure such as bridges, public transit, highways, and water and
sewer systems.
When a regulation, challenged as a taking, is carefully integrated
into such a comprehensive system of land use regulation, the natural
tendency of judges to defer to law makers will be reinforced greatly. If
stricter scrutiny poses a threat to the potency of land use regulations,
then comprehensive and intelligent legislation that adheres to the principle of maximum fairness will keep control where it historically has
been. Absent a showing by a particular property owner of an egregious
burden, judges and justices are more likely to behave as they did in
Gardner, deferring in tone and substance to the rule of law as competently expressed by the elected representatives of the people.

298. See Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 1990s. 24 Lou. L.A.
L. REV.905 (1991). At least the following states have adopted growth management statutes: norida, see FLA.STAT.ANN. $8 163.3161-.3243 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992); Georgia, see GA. CODE
ANN.ch. 36-70 (Michie Supp. 1992); Hawaii, see HAW. REV. STAT.ch. 13-205 (1985 & Supp.
1991); Kentucky, see KY. REV.STAT.ANN. $9 100.lll-.I97 (MichieIBobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp.
1990); Maine, see ME. REV.STAT.ANN. tit. 30-A, $8 4311-44 (West 1991); New Jersey, see N.J.
STAT.ANN. $8 40:55D-1 to -112 (West Supp. 1990); Oregon, see OR. REV.STAT.ch. 197 (1991);
Rhode Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWSch. 45-22 (1991); Vermont, see VT. STAT.ANN. tit. 24, $8
4301-87 (1975 & Supp. 1991); Washington, see WASH.
REV.CODEANN.ch. 36.70A (West 1991 &
Supp. 1992).
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